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“Simply put, it is possible to have convenience if you want to tolerate 
insecurity; but if you want security, you must be prepared for 
inconvenience.” 
~United States Air Force Four-Star General Benjamin W. Chidlaw - 
12/12/54 
 
In 1954, General Chidlaw spoke these words as our country began to take steps to 
prepare for what was then called “a new reality”- the possibility of a nuclear 
attack. As Americans prepared for this new reality, fallout shelters were 
constructed in public housing areas, movie theatres and in business locations. 
Schoolchildren and school administrators everywhere were forced to become 
familiar with drills designed to protect them from the fallout of a nuclear 
disaster. On numerous occasions throughout the school year, children huddled 
together under desks and tables in classrooms and stood in tight formation in 
hallways, while being ever mindful to face away from windows and glass panes 
from classroom doors. Experience now shows us that while these steps appeared 
to be practical in nature, in fact they would have done very little to prevent 
serious injury or death from the residual effects of a nuclear weapon. These steps 
did however have value in a subtle, perhaps unintended way: they created a new 
culture of preparedness in our nation’s schools. 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 also thrust our nation into a new reality.  No 
longer did we have to fear devastating attacks from an enemy that maintained its 
foothold abroad. This new reality showed us that the enemy resides within our 
shores and will use unconventional means to upset our way of life. The events of 
September 11, 2001 also showed education officials in New York City and across 
the country that schools do not have to be the intended target of a terrorist 
attack in order to suffer long lasting damage. In the case of the schools in the 
immediate vicinity of the former World Trade Center complex, many suffered 
structural damage and also lost the use of schoolbooks and other instructional 
material because of the exposure to falling debris or airborne contaminants. 
Moreover, schools outside the immediate grid of this disaster were affected as 
well. Because of transit or traffic delays or cancellations, some students were 
forced to wait in schools for hours into the night until parents or authorized 
caretakers came to pick them up. Further, the attacks on the Pentagon had a 
direct effect on children in the greater Washington D.C. area, because a number 
 2
of students on a school trip were on the fateful flight that was crashed into the 
Pentagon. 
 
As the former Executive Director of Student Safety and senior law 
enforcement/security official for the New York City Department of Education 
(NYCDOE), I worked closely with officials from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, the United States Department of Education and a number of 
other city, state and federal law enforcement agencies to address security and 
disaster related issues that arose for the many schools in the lower Manhattan 
area that were affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
 
Because of my work in this regard, I have been asked to share what I have called 
“the untold story,” the story of how my colleagues at the NYCDOE, in partnership 
with the New York City Police Department School Safety Division, were successful 
in evacuating over nine thousand students and staff from eight schools that were 
in close proximity to the former World Trade Center. While this was no easy feat, 
we were successful in reuniting the over one million students across the city with 
their loved ones, without one child or staff member being hurt, lost or killed. 
 
I have shared this story with large numbers of school safety officials at the 
national and international level as well as with police chiefs, parents, school 
administrators and homeland security/emergency management experts. Every 
audience was in awe of the accomplishments of this day and of the days and 
weeks afterwards. In my mind, this act and the countless ones that followed to 
keep the “educational ship afloat” are essential parts of a story that must be told 
to ensure that schools and the communities that surround them are prepared to 
respond and recover from a catastrophic disaster or act of terrorism. What 
follows is that story - full of lessons learned- lessons that will serve any school 
district well as they deal with a disaster, large or small. 
 
An all embracing thank you goes out to Dr. Nancy Degnan and her graduate 
students for taking the steps to chronicle this story through painstaking interviews 
and note taking. Lastly, a huge salute goes out to my former colleagues at the 
NYCDOE, especially to the principals, administrators, teachers, paraprofessionals, 
school aides, custodians, cafeteria professionals and any other person(s) or 
employee(s) that I through oversight failed to name, who put their lives and 
emotions in harm’s way to save or shield a child from the dangers of that day. No 
employment contract that was signed or job description that was drafted called 
for these acts of heroism; but when duty called, they all answered the bell. 
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I would like to close with a quote attributed to a nameless teacher who was 
working at P.S. 234, located four short blocks from the World Trade Center. On 
the fateful day, which should be noted was the fourth day of school for our 
school system, this teacher is quoted by Ms. Anna Switzer, the then principal of 
P.S. 234 as saying ….” I learned an important lesson on that day…that I could only 
run as fast as my slowest child.” 
 
Gregory A. Thomas, MS 
 Director, The Program for School Preparedness and Planning 
 National Center for Disaster Preparedness 









Eight public schools are situated within a quarter mile of Ground Zero with 9,000 
students ranging in ages from three to eighteen years – grammar, middle and high 
schools. On Tuesday, September 11, 2001 in the midst of chaos and a relentless 
unfolding of tragedy, professionals of the Board of Education safely evacuated all 
9,000 students without injury.  They also ensured that all 1.1 million school children, 
in every part of the city got home safely, reunited with family and loved ones.  They 
did this as transportation around the City was halted, subways, roads, bridges were 
closed, and airspace over the United States was shutdown except to military flights.    
 
This report is the articulation of a truly effective reaction by a complex organization.  
Some would label it as luck or extraordinary good fortune. In fact, when all the 
evidence is finally in, this report argues that the Board of Education’s handling of the 
crisis presented by 9/11, comprised its “shining moment” – where leadership and 
courage were manifest and where the paramount objective “get our kids home safe” 
made the difference between life and death.  
 
Early in October 2001, the Board of Education contacted me to document what the 
Board of Education did in response to the World Trade Center attack. Capturing how 
and how well BOE personnel responded would be an important contribution to the 
knowledge base – and would, ultimately, provide a testament to the courage and 
actions of those involved.  
 
I taught a course each spring at Columbia University’s School of International and 
Public Affairs entitled the Workshop in Applied Policy Analysis. The objective of the 
course was to enable advanced graduate students of public administration to research 
issues of importance to a nonprofit or government client. The New York City Board of 
Education became the Workshop client for that semester. Over a ten-week period, the 
Workshop Team would help to define the contours of the 9/11 issues, research them 
through primary and secondary data gathering and assemble recommendations from 
the interviews.   
 
I began with interviews in the fall of 2001 to tap peoples’ memories of 9/11 as close to 
the events as possible. The project moved forward through February 2002 and was 
completed by the end of May 2002, as the Workshop Team also conducted interviews 
and reviewed secondary research materials, and produced a final report and briefing.  
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From the outset, one thing became clear. Professionals at the Board of Education 
Central office in Brooklyn as well as those in the schools at Ground Zero and 
throughout the five Boroughs of New York City conducted themselves with courage, 
clarity and conviction all toward the same goal of the safety and well being of all 
children in their care.  Sadly, no other public or private institution experienced the 
levels of successful evacuation of nearly 9,000 children, staff and teachers from the 
area surrounding the Twin Towers without injury, though the heroic efforts of fire 
fighters and police led 25,000 occupants from the Towers. Approximately 2,800 people 
died in the Towers among them 343 FDNY and 60 NYPD and Port Authority police and 
personnel1. 
 
Something went right that day beyond all factors that could have conspired for things 
to go terribly, irrevocably wrong for school children in New York City -- as events did 
for so many others lost in the air and on the ground in these United States. In the days 
and months that followed the events of 9/11, the same dedication was manifest even 
as the complexities of recovery made decisions more controversial.   
 
The final chapter of the report, entitled, 9/11: Two Years Later, offers insight into the 
resolution of issues that emerged in the early parts of recovery.  In the interim 
between 9/11/2001 and 9/11/2003, the New York City Board of Education has become 
the New York City Department of Education. A new Chancellor was selected, Joel 
Klein, and changes also occurred in the senior executive management.  With this 
change, a number of personnel who were originally involved in the 9/11 response and 
recovery, retired or took positions at other organizations. When they left their 
knowledge and experience left with them. 
 
On 9/11 and afterward, one of the individuals deeply involved in response and 
recovery was Gregory Thomas. At the time of the World Trade Center attacks Thomas 
was Director of School Safety. He is now Director at the Program for School 
Preparedness and Planning at Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster 
Preparedness, Mailman School of Public Health. The Center focuses on how 
organizational systems, like school systems and public health systems, protect children 
and vulnerable populations in time of disaster. Thomas suggested that the original 
report would be enhanced by looking back at 9/11 and putting response and recovery 
into a longer-term perspective.   
 
In addition to re-interviewing Gregory Thomas, the last chapter of this paper captures 
the thoughts of Ada Dolch, Principal of the High School of Public Service, a high school 
that sits right at Ground Zero. The issues of 9/11 as related to the impacts on safety as 
well as on the longer-term wellbeing of a community of teachers, students and staff 
are, clearly, specific to New York City and 9/11. The information about the particular 
 6
set of impacts, however, offers a modeling opportunity for those who are charged with 
the safety and wellbeing of students, nationwide. Thus, the update of this report and 
findings creates a unique contribution to that knowledge base. 
 
This has been a difficult report to research and to write. The material of it conjures 
again and again the events of that day – the death, the destruction and the ultimate of 
human courage, responsibility and sacrifice.  
 
It has been my honor to act as a researcher, as faculty to the graduate student 
researchers, and as the author of this report. It has also been an honor to work with 
the professionals of The Board of Education/Department of Education of the City of 
New York.  
 
 
    Nancy Degnan 
    December 2004 







“No one is ready for something like this.  We didn’t over-react.  We 
were as clear as possible.  We pulled together, got information out, 
and kept kids safe.  I am very proud of our people.” 
 ~ Harold O. Levy, Former Chancellor, New York City Board of 
Education     
 
September 11, 2001 presented the greatest security challenge ever faced by the 
New York City Board of Education (BOE, hereafter). Its magnitude and scope far 
surpassed any emergency the system, or any other public education system in the 
country, had ever encountered. Review of the events pointed to several important 
factors of successful2 response and recovery actions. These included: 
organizational culture, degree of professional experience within the system, the 
retrofitting of standard operating procedures at the operation and programmatic 
levels, safety simulation and practice, and personal courage.  All were articulated 
to the first order of commitment, the safety and well being of children. Indeed, in 
interviews with school officials, universal reference was made to “our kids” (or our 
children) never, “the kids”. This cultural norm marked the response and recovery 
mode. In response, the on-the-ground decision makers at Ground Zero level 
succeeded in the secure evacuation of 9,000 students and staff.  At the BOE, 
Chancellor Harold Levy decided to keep schools open,3 making the counter intuitive 
determination to forego reuniting children with families/caregivers immediately, 
and thus, maintaining the opportunity for orderly release and transport for 
students and staff citywide.   
 
Recovery mode would become more controversial as decisions became more 
complex. Core to this was the challenge faced by BOE of how and how quickly to 
return to “normalcy”, particularly with respect to the re-opening of Stuyvesant 
High School, academically renowned within the New York City school system.  At 
no time, however, did the decision makers deviate from the objective of sustained 
well being of students.  
 
A set of other challenges would present itself to the BOE as recovery moved 
forward. Fiscal, curricular, mental health, inter-agency relations issues all emerged 
as actions and decisions by top management were crystallized and implemented.  
In addition, those engaged with the education system in development and delivery 
of services were impacted. The requirements of working with outside vendors, for 
instance, became more complex in consideration of heightened security. Likewise, 
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the BOE would work closely with mental health experts, community based 
organizations, and federal, state and city officials to ensure coordination of 
efforts, anticipation of needs and rapid problem solving.  
 
Each chapter of this report illustrates the response and recovery actions taken by 
the BOE as well as an assessment of those actions.  Recommendations are listed at 
the end of the report. Chapter titles are: 1. Decision making; 2. Transportation;   
3. Facilities and Support Personnel; 4. Food services; 5. Communication; 6. Mental 
Health; 7. Curriculum; 8. Fiscal; 9. Student safety; 10. Conclusion; and 11. 9/11: 
Two Years Later.   
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A NOTE TO THE READER 
 
Disaster planning encompasses 4 stages: prevention (mitigation), preparedness, 
response, and recovery.  The “story” of the Board of Education and 9/11 should 
be read as a case study that seeks to illustrate two important components of 
Disaster Planning:  Response and Recovery.  A case study, as the researcher 
Robert Yin describes it, is “an inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context… and lends itself to what, how and why 
questions” (Yin 1989:16).  In interviews each person was asked to convey his/her 
part in the handling of the terrorist attack within the framework of questions:  
what did you do on 9/11 and the days that followed; how did you do it; and why 
did you take the actions you took?  By posing these particular questions, the 
professionals could reflect on their own personal experiences and put those 
experiences/actions within a broader context of the organization of the Board of 
Education.    
 
That the story of 9/11 does not focus on the aspects disaster planning involving 
prevention and preparedness is seen in the actual design of the three interview 
questions.  However, what happened in response and recovery from the point of 
view of the 32 individuals most intimately involved can be woven back into a 
consideration of prevention/preparedness. The BOE story informs the first two 
stages in disaster planning from the perspective of the catastrophe of 9/11 –the 
only event that has been defined as the greatest attack against the United States.  
9/11, furthermore, stressed every public and private system and in some cases 
rendered systems non-operational.   
 
What is clear from the case study is that several aspects of disaster planning 
proved critical. These include: 1. Effective decision making on the part of those 
at the site of disaster is crucial.  This leadership role is one that individuals need 
to be empowered to take on; likewise, they should be trained for this role prior 
to any event; 2. Emergency response plans ought to be constructed within a 
framework of meeting the key considerations in any emergency.  However, they 
also need to be generic and dynamic enough to adapt to moment-to-moment 
requirements of the unfolding disaster; 3. The safety and well-being of 
responders including those in leadership roles must be a priority.  Likewise, 
particular attention in response will be required for those who are most 
vulnerable including children and children with special needs. This focus has to 
continue into recovery stage; 4. Communications and communication systems will 
always be compromised, if not fail, as the disaster unfolds. Plans must allow for 
multiple means of communication in times of incomplete information or total 
communication blackout; 5. Resources will be stressed and must be assigned to 
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those, who need them most, first.  How to prioritize in response is typically more 
straightforward than in recovery; 6. The recovery phase usually lasts longer and 
requires far greater planning and far greater resources than one can predict.  
 
Points 5 and 6 have significant relevance for bureaucracies at the local, state and 
national levels. Organizations will find themselves needing to be flexible in their 
standard operating procedures particularly around getting money and finances 
into the system for programming designed to meet the ongoing needs. Likewise, 
bureaucracies should recognize that as recovery is a long process, and a complex 
one and it will sometimes, become political. Finally, recovery does have a goal 
and it is resiliency. How to define resiliency, how to recognize it, how to sustain 
it should also be a part of the holistic approach in disaster planning.   
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
New York City Schools: The New York City Board of Education is the largest 
public school system in the United States. The system is a diverse one with nearly 
120 different languages spoken by students and their families. The Board 
represents over 1.1 million students and approximately 140,000 staff.4  Table One 














1,105,045 41,069 501,296 194,753 281,502 86,425 
 
 
While the BOE understood that all children within the New York City system were 
impacted by 9/11, it also identified several groups of students that were most 
vulnerable in the wake of the events. These included those who: lost someone in 
their family (1,493)6, were evacuated from Ground Zero radius (approximately 
9,000); witnessed the collapse of the Towers (some subset of 9,000); were 
members of the Arab or Muslim population.7   While response would focus in on 
the physical safety and well being of all students, recovery would particularly 
involve issues of mental well-being trauma mitigation, environmental concerns, 
temporary relocation, plans for return to normal operations, financial planning, 
and anti-bias curricular support.   
 
The BOE would also need to address lost instructional time. Students from 
evacuated and closed schools were relocated within the system; and, eventually 
would be returned to their original schools. The impact for students in schools 
outside of ground zero occurred as regular class time was replaced with an anti-
bias curriculum and other related but necessary discussions on 9/11. Although 
these discussions took away from normal coursework, the mental health experts 
and professional staff advised the Board to prioritize them and support the 
classroom as a forum where students could discuss their feelings openly.  
Additionally, some schools experienced bomb threats during the weeks after 
9/11; the learning environment was further disrupted by the anthrax episodes as 
well as by the tragic airplane crash in the Far Rockaways, in Queens, New York.   
The quick “return to normalcy” was, in some ways, predicated upon the desire to 
mitigate such disruptions.8  Inasmuch as New York State and Federal law requires 
testing of all New York City School children, BOE officials were concerned with 
academic outcomes for the year 2001-02. BOE officials calculated that the cost of 
lost instruction time, system-wide, approached $100 million. The BOE would 
make a request to the federal government (FEMA and the U.S. DOE) for that 
funding.9 
 
To provide a context for discussion, a Map of the World Trade Center and a 
Timeline of how the events of 9/11 unfolded are presented.
 




This map of the ground zero area shows the seven schools at the site. Murry 
Bergtraum High School (student enrollment is about 3,000) located at One Police 
Plaza was not included on this map because it is located outside the official 
Ground Zero Border. However, this school was evacuated along with those schools 
at Ground Zero on 9/11 because officials feared that One Police Plaza would be 
bombed. 
 
As you will also notice, the World Trade Center was located very close to the 
shoreline of the Hudson River. Ferries (the Staten Island) and tugboats, as well as 
other vessels, operated in this waterway. As part of the evacuation on 9/11, 
principals and teachers would take advantage of this resource using creative 
adaptation of emergency planning to put their students on the ferries and 
tugboats.  The students were transported to locations on Staten Island (NY) and 
New Jersey (see Chapter I).  
 
The Timeline gives an example of how events at the World Trade Center 
coincided with decisions at the Board both at the central offices in Brooklyn and 




Tuesday, September 11, 2001 
• 8:46 a.m.: Plane hits World Trade Center (World Trade Center) Tower #111 
 
• 9:02 a.m.: Plane hit World Trade Center Tower #212 
 Schools in the immediate area begin evacuation. 
 All other schools in NYC are placed on heightened security 
 
• 9:17 a.m. The Federal Aviation Administration shuts down all New York 
City area airports.  
 
• 9:21 a.m. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey orders all bridges 
and tunnels in and out of the New York area closed. 
 Subway and bus system throughout the City are disrupted 
 
• 9:59 a.m. The south tower of the World Trade Center (#2) collapses, 
plummeting into the streets below. A massive cloud of dust and debris 
forms and slowly drifts away from the building.13  
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• 10:29 a.m. The World Trade Center’s north tower (#1) collapses from the 
top down as if it were being peeled apart, releasing a tremendous cloud of 
debris and smoke.14  
 Airspace over the entire United States in the process of shut-down 
 Military flights begin over New York City 
 
• 11:02 a.m. Area south of Canal Street is evacuated  
 
• 2:49 p.m.  Subway and bus service are partially restored in New York City.  
 
• 5:20 p.m. The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex 
collapses. The evacuated building is damaged when the Twin Towers 
across the street collapse earlier in the day. Other nearby buildings 
were burning. 
 
• 9:57 p.m. Mayor Giuliani announces the Chancellor’s decision to close 
New York City schools on Wednesday 
 
NB: By 1 a.m. on Wednesday, September 12, 2001, the BOE had accounted for the 
wellbeing of all students in the New York City School System.  
 
METHODS OF RESEARCH 
The immediate response and continued recovery actions taken by the New York 
City Board of Education on 9/11 have been documented in this report.  Primary 
research came from 32 interviews conducted with decision makers and crisis 
management professionals across functional areas within the Board of Education, 
over a total time frame of about six months (October 2001 – March 2002). To 
ensure accurate attribution to them, the interviewees reviewed their transcripts.  
Research materials included Board of Education documents, memos, directives, 
news articles, and federal, state, and municipal agency reports. In addition, two 
individuals were re-interviewed for Chapter XI, Ms. Ada Dolch, Principal, The High 
School of Leadership and Public Service and Gregory Thomas, National Center for 
Disaster Preparedness, Mailman School of Public Health.    
   
The Team of Student Researchers from Columbia University’s School of 
International and Public Affairs is listed below. 
• Yumie Song 
• Peggy Borelli 
• Kimberly Bayer 
• Saroya Friedman  
• Raul Galindo  
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• Miho Hirose    
• Emily Joyce    
• Jordan Lieberman  
• Randi Marshall  
• Nadine Mentor    
• Tweeps Poli Phillips  




CHAPTER I – DECISION MAKING 
 
On September 11, 2001 over 9,000 students, staff and teachers were safely 
evacuated from schools in the immediate vicinity of ground zero schools and One 
Police Plaza. In addressing the crisis, the Board of Education successfully retrofit 
operations and procedures. However, the response that enabled the safety and 
well being of evacuated persons as well as the remainder of 1.1 million people 
system-wide was achieved through critical use of on-the-ground decision making, 
informed by intelligence, creativity, and courage. 
  
“I asked every teacher who was left and they knew exactly who 
[which students] they had. I was the last one out. I grabbed my 
purse, grabbed some of the kids’ records and locked the door like I 
would be back tomorrow. We evacuated between 75-100 kids. We 
evacuated right after the first tower collapsed. There was a rush of 
people up our street and vehicles rushing down the street. It was 
frantic...the safety plan was not that relevant in this situation. The 
one thing I knew to do was to sweep [final search] the building, so we 
had the fireman (custodian) do that. We couldn’t use the safety plan- 
it said to evacuate to Stuyvesant across the street.” 
~ Principal, BOE    
 
“You have to… compile and disseminate clear, concise information; 
extend empathy and understanding; say yes; say no; resist being 
dragged into the fear of it; deliver what you promise, always; keep 
lines of communication open; treat everyone as an individual; and ask 
of others, only what I ask of myself.”  
       ~ Burt Sacks, (Former) Chief Executive, Division of External Relations  
 
“At the same time at ground zero, teachers were making decisions on 
their own. They had evacuation plans – but evacuation plans said to 
go to Stuyvesant…or elsewhere. They all did the right thing. One 
principal sent her kids on the Staten Island Ferry…  Kids ended up at 
Curtis High School. This principal knew she had to get all her kids out 
and then she walked [to Brooklyn], here into my office with dust all 
over her in shock…  She felt she had to report where her kids were 
and what happened. There was extraordinary sense of duty and 
obligation in the system. At the site itself, people reacted very well.”  




On 9/11, the primary and most difficult task for the Board of Education was the 
safe evacuation of all students, teachers, and staff in the vicinity of the World 
Trade Center. Then, in the minutes and hours following the attacks, the Board 
focused its efforts on two objectives: locating all of its children and adults and 
transporting all to safety.   
 
The safe and quick transport of students out of the danger zone immediately 
following the attacks became the responsibility of the teachers, principals, and 
superintendents in the schools in the radius of Ground Zero. With communication 
down and limited access to the Board of Education’s main office in Brooklyn, 
school principals had to rely upon their own decision making skills and experience 
to safely evacuate more than 9,000 people from the area. The transportation and 
safe discharge of the remaining 1.1 million (approximately) school children 
throughout the City would be the responsibility of the Chancellor and his staff, in 
particular, the Office of Pupil Transportation. The Board would also assume 
responsibility for coordinating with officials in the private and parochial schools 
to ensure the wellbeing of that portion of the student population. Children in 
non-public schools make-up approximately 20 percent of pupils in New York City. 
 
The World Trade Center attack occurred on the fourth day of a new school year, 
before principals and teachers had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with 
the students or the parents. The affected schools included primary and 
intermediary schools: P.S. 234, P.S. 150, P.S. 89, I.S. 89, P.S. 721 and high 
schools:  Stuyvesant High School, High School of Leadership and Public Service, 
the High School of Economics and Finance and Murry Bergtraum High school 
(across from One Police Plaza).15 
 
Each school in the New York City system is required to file a safety plan with the 
Board of Education and the New York City Police Department.16  Gregory Thomas, 
Director, Student Safety and Prevention, headed the office that oversees the 
process of schools developing and submitting plans to meet the requirement.  He 
and his staff were also responsible for helping to ensure safe environments within 
the school buildings and in the communities around the schools.17  
 
School safety plans stipulate the protocol taken in an emergency; and, these 
plans are updated every year.18 The Board of Education, New York City Police 
Department, and the Fire Department work together for the security of students 
within the school system19. One specific element of these plans, fire drills, are 
required to be tested twelve times a year. Principals of the schools at Ground 
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Zero would later attest to the importance of fire drills and their role in supporting 
the calm and orderly nature of the evacuation. 
 
Respecting protocol, principals from each of the schools around Ground Zero 
made contact with the superintendent’s office immediately after the first plane 
hit Tower One20. A preliminary decision was that all students were to remain in 
the schools, because the buildings had structural stability and safety. In addition, 
principals allowed children to leave if their parents came to pick them up.  
However schools differed in their policies regarding students leaving with non-
parents. For example, one principal only allowed a parent or guardian listed on 
the child’s emergency card to take the child home. Yet, other principals at 
allowed any adult with whom they were familiar with to sign students out and left 
specific instructions on where that child went in case the parents came to the 
school.21 The Board of Education made the decision that all other schools outside 
the affected area should hold the children until an adult picked them up.22   
 
When the second plane hit the Tower Two, however, evacuation of schools 
began. The High Schools of Economics and Finance and Leadership and Public 
Service are located just 200 yards from the World Trade Center on Trinity Place.23   
 
Plans24 for both of these high schools identified a third high school, Stuyvesant 
High School as the safety location. However, Stuyvesant High school was north of 
the World Trade Center. In order to reach the high school, students and staff 
would have to pass directly through the attack area. The decision was made by 
principals at the scene to modify the safety plans and instead evacuate south of 
the World Trade Center. The only means of transportation in the affected vicinity 
was by walking. Students and staff were already walking away from  the school as 
the North Tower collapsed.25  A principal described the scene: 
 
We were joined in the street by people fleeing from the Towers 
covered in ash…We left right before the North Tower came down.  
We heard this unbelievable rumble and everyone turned in disbelief.  
The building fell like a stack of cards.  We walked together, told the 
kids to move quickly and keep their heads down.  I wasn’t scared, it 
was very communal… it was difficult to walk… I had to throw rubber 
tubing out of the way…26 
 
Along with the high schools, Primary Schools I.S. and P.S. 89 as well as P.S. 150 
were evacuated. All were supposed to evacuate to Stuyvesant as was required for 
the high schools. Principals and teachers had to make a similar decision to find an 
alternate safety route and instead of Stuyvesant they went to P.S. 3 on 
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Christopher Street and Hudson.27  The principals consulted with district offices as 
well as safety officials and indicated their change of plan. The teachers led the 
children in an orderly manner towards their evacuation site. They endeavored to 
keep in contact with the district office while en route but eventually lost cell 
phone capability. Once at the evacuation site, the principals and staff worked 
assiduously with other parents to locate each remaining child’s parent and get 
each child home safely.28   
 
At about 10:30 a.m., police officials ordered the evacuation of Stuyvesant High 
School itself. Students left by the North entrance (again away from the World 
Trade Center) and dispersed throughout the City.  The anecdotes concerning how 
students reached safety are many. Ninety-four of these students spent the night 
on cots at Curtis High School in Staten Island after taking the ferry from 
Manhattan. Principals and teachers flagged down a tugboat at Battery Park that 
took some students to Upper Manhattan and Queens. School officials escorted 
many students on ferries to Staten Island and New Jersey. One principal walked 
her students across the Brooklyn Bridge to take her students to safety.29
 
BOE officials noted that re-unification of children and parents presented 
enormous challenges. At Ground Zero, parent concern during these hours was 
exacerbated by disruptions in communication and the need to deviate from safety 
plans.  In addition, the chaos that was unfolding at the World Trade Center fed 
fears that children were in danger or worse, injured or dead. Terrorism promotes 
a particular kind of chaos. It is clear, for instance, that in the evacuation of the 
World Trade Center collapse keeping track of children at the primary school level 
was more effective than at the high school level. Likewise, the actions of BOE 
staff were illustrative of the requirements to be adaptive in response to unfolding 
events, while remaining vigilant to the highest priority of keeping children and 
staff safe. 
 
From the moment the first plane hit the Tower at 8:46 am to the return of 
children to home at 1 am on the morning of September 12, it took sixteen hours 
to locate and/or ensure the reuniting of children with their families. There is no 
comparable disaster to contrast with this time frame. Nonetheless, taking note of 
it may inform future planning involving evacuation in large and complex 
educational systems. The geography of New York City clearly impacted the routes 
and methods of evacuation. Other school systems may want to seriously consider 
their geographical contours when developing safety plans in an era of terrorism.  
In addition, the neighborhoods and communities throughout the five Boroughs (as 
well as in New Jersey) made room for anyone that was seeking haven. Chancellor 
Levy remarked in an interview, “One lesson I learned was about the social 
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structure of the City – it’s much stronger than I thought. All the kids were 
absorbed.”30  The BOE personnel engaged in responding to terrorism at the World 
Trade Center were acting with incomplete information. Nonetheless, their 
decisiveness was key to the well being of their students.   
 
Back at the BOE Headquarters in Brooklyn, Chancellor Levy and his staff were 
working to develop strategies for the system to be put in place as the immediate 
dangers of the ground zero were handled. Again these strategies were being 
developed within crisis management marked by incomplete information. 
 
The overriding objective was to get 1.1 million children home  and re-united with 
their families. In consultation with senior staff, the Chancellor made the decision 
to keep all New York City schools open. This step was predicated upon: The 
necessity to keep the subways from being used during the very first hours after 
the collapse for the safety of students; knowledge that streets were impassable; 
the closure of bridges and tunnels for bus traffic; the relative safety of the 
schools themselves. Chancellor Levy was also concerned that parents would not 
be able to get home and ultimately, in his words, he “was concerned that we 
might have orphans.”31 Chancellor Levy’s decision was met with some initial 
resistance from New York City’s Mayor Giuliani, which was quickly overturned by 
Chancellor Levy’s arguments and his ability to take a major concern from the 
Mayor’s hands.32  
 
Throughout the day, Chancellor Levy continued to monitor the crisis, and 
contacted the chancellor of schools in Oklahoma City.33 Chancellor Levy also 
provided instruction to staff at both the central and decentralized levels in 3 
separate emails with the final email being sent at 5:49 p.m., notifying all school 
personnel that schools would be closed September 12. In that email he also asked 
all principals, assistant principals, guidance counselors, social workers, 
psychologists and crisis teams to report to their schools to prepare plans to 
respond to the tragedy.34  Chancellor Levy explained his decision in this way: 
   
We made the decision not to open schools the following day. The 
whole city was reeling. Transportation system was still out of whack.  
We asked teachers and principals to come to school if they could.  
We had to deal with the psychological response – I talked to the 
commissioner of education from Oklahoma. Others talked to LA and 
Columbine.  We pulled things off the Internet and we put a package 




Also, throughout the day, Chancellor Levy’s staff compiled the teaching and 
administrative support materials that would be required at the schools.   
 
One team worked on a K-12 Curriculum which focused on how to understand and 
process the events of 9/11.36 Of particular concern to everyone was the real 
possibility of bias-related attacks on Muslims or people appearing to be Muslims.  
The anti-bias curriculum was produced and delivered to schools by the very next 
day, September 12.37
  
Likewise, the team for student support services was handling an onslaught of calls 
to help with emotional trauma and mental well being.38 The response included 
two main objectives. First, all calls were answered, and accurate information on 
how the Board manages volunteer services was imparted; and, second, Board 
professionals began (almost immediately) to put together materials supporting 
teachers for recognizing trauma and mental health crisis in children.39   
 
At a broader level, BOE decision makers began contacting experts who had dealt 
with impacts of violence on schools, school systems and the children within them.  
Chancellor Levy and his Deputy Chancellor Anthony Shorris reached out to experts 
around the country saving valuable time in understanding what had to be done by 
September 12 and 13. Being stymied or stumped in actions was simply not 
acceptable in a crisis of this magnitude. It was in the hours soon after the 
terrorist attacks that people such as Marleen Wong of the Los Angeles Unified 
School District, Dr. Michael Cohen, a psychologist who had worked on issues after 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Dr. Pam Cantor of the Children’s 
Mental Health Alliance, and Yale University were all contacted for the expertise 
and support.40  Each provided valuable insight on how to work with organizations 
such as FEMA and the Department of Education (Wong) and create groups such as 
the Partnership for Recovery of the New York City Schools (Cohen and Cantor) 
providing for coordinated efforts in mental healing as well as much needed 
oversight.41  
 
In handling communication out of the Board to the media the Board decided 
immediately to vet all information before the Chancellor. No one but the 
Chancellor (although sometimes through his public information officer) was 
empowered to convey status of the system to the media. The dedication to 
accurate information dissemination continued after 9/11 and was supported by 
the fact of Levy’s presence at each of Mayor Giuliani’s daily 9/11 briefings. 
 
Schools opened two hours late on September 13, with: the safe evacuation of 
9,000 students and staff from ground zero; the re-uniting of 1.1 million children, 
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system-wide, with families; an anti-bias curriculum in place; coordination and 
planning for mental health established; outreach to experts conducted; fiscal 
plans being put into place; and physical clean-up underway.  
 
RECOVERY 
Recovery for the school system was multifaceted and complex. While the Board 
was engaged in recovery through out City schools, they were also focused on 
working with teachers, parents, children, and the emergency professionals in the 
evacuated and relocated schools.42 While the BOE had received tremendous 
support from experts who had worked in recovery in Oklahoma City, Columbine 
and in other disasters, still much needed to be understood about the scope and 
duration of recovery.43  
 
System-wide concerns included lost instructional time, transportation, curriculum 
development and mental health support for all students. For the schools at 
Ground Zero the Board was engaged in planning for relocation of students.  In 
addition, they took on the support of schools as public sector facilities used in 
recovery. The evacuated schools at Ground Zero functioned as morgues and 
shelters. The “school house” became the purview of FEMA, City police and fire 
fighters, FBI and the military; BOE custodians and engineers remained in the 
school buildings to ensure the safety and well being of rescue personnel and 
emergency officials. Furthermore, central office BOE professionals supported 
operations like food delivery, production and distribution, garbage removal, and 
supply delivery. Overarching all of these activities was the attention paid to the 
environmental considerations and air quality risks and the requirement of the 
physical clean up of the eight schools at Ground Zero.44 In addition, the 
magnitude of the fiscal impact of recovery for the education system was 
becoming clearer and clearer as specifics of recovery were presented.45
 
The BOE faced controversy in relocating and re-opening evacuated schools, 
considered by some as having hazardous air quality. In addition, the BOE 
remained firm in its pre-9/11 requirement to administer the standardized testing 
for grade advancement. The BOE thought it important to maintain this standard 
even in the face of disruptions to the system.    
 
The actual process of relocating students in new schools and then a few months 
later returning the students to their original schools took a significant amount of 
coordination and time.46 Transportation, safety and instructional issues were 
addressed as well as ongoing sense of responsibility to communicate with parents 
about how the Board was working through these issues.47 Parents were concerned 
that their children would be unsafe in new neighborhoods and school buildings.  
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They and the children were impacted by transport through relatively long 
distances to the relocated schools. For instance, it was possible that some 
students could be on buses three to four hours a day as new routes were being 
developed due to road detours and closing. For students traveling by subways, the 
disruptions would continue for several months.48   
 
Board professionals responded to these complexities at both an interpersonal and 
technical level. Burt Sacks, Chief Executive, Division of External Relations 
spearheaded the relocation and reopening of impacted schools. He defined 
meeting with parents, school officials, union members and students as a priority 
of recovery. In addition, Mr. Sacks worked closely with Kevin Gill on 
transportation. Mr. Gill focused on easing transitions during the months following 
September 11. One example is Mr. Gill’s actions around familiarizing entire 
families with new bus routes by allowing parents and siblings of students with 
special needs to ride with them until a sense of comfort was achieved49 (see 
Chapter II). Likewise, Stephen O’Brien, Coordinator of Food Services for 
Manhattan, made certain that the very first school breakfast for relocated 
children was familiar, warm and aromatic – and staffed by the same food 
providers in the schools the children typically attended. Children got to see the 
people they always saw at breakfast, a source of comfort and continuity in a very 
mixed-up time.50  
  
In addressing environmental concerns, the Board committed to complete clean-up 
of the schools. In particular for the evacuated schools, the commitment was to 
“convince parents that schools would be safe.”51 Again, officials at the Board 
turned to experts. Environmental staff who worked within the organization 
contracted with health and safety experts at Mt. Sinai Hospital and at New York 
University.52  Two other sets of environmental consultants were hired, those of 
the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and those hired by parent associations.53  
Extensive testing of air quality occurred at various intervals of the week as well 
as the 24 hours of a day. The physical clean-up of debris from the Towers’ 
collapse, of course, happened around-the-clock. A specific controversy emerged 
with regard to an EPA Ombudsman Report54 of poor air quality, particularly at 
Stuyvesant High School. It was balanced by the other (independently secured) 
consultant reports and by the willingness of the Board to work with the 
consultants, parents and the Teachers’ Union and consider their 
recommendations.   
 
Recovery necessarily involved lost instructional time. The Board’s decision to 
remain steadfast in testing, as stated previously, met with resistance by parents 
and some educators.55  Interestingly, test scores for grades 3 and 4 in District 2 
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Schools evacuated on September 11 and engaged in relocation, -- P.S. 89, P.S. 
150, and P.S. 234 – indicated an increase, or nearly equal, levels of performance 
from 2001-2002. In all cases, these schools outperformed schools citywide.56   
 
While no direct correlation can be made between the performance of these 
schools and the actions of the BOE in recovery, the support of the BOE most 
certainly had beneficial impact on the magnitude of disruption. Students and 
teachers did continue their work of learning in these schools and it was measured 
positively. Furthermore, the BOE’s requirement of testing has actually enabled 
the documentation of a school year like no other. The data is unique, important 
to the understanding of effects, and hopefully informative to educators and 
others interested in the well-being of school children.  
 
ASSESSMENT 
The successful decision making of the key Board personnel at the centralized and 
decentralized levels may be described by four factors: 1. Motivation to protect all 
people in the school system; 2. delineated chain of command and adaptation of 
standard operating procedures; 3. prioritization the life, safety and the safe 
reunion of children with parents; and 4. effective use of formal and informal 
networks to enhance institutional knowledge of recovery and response.  
 
1. MOTIVATION TO PROTECT: The professionals at the Board of Education operated 
under an organizational cultural norm of “protecting our kids.” As events 
transpired on 9/11, at Ground Zero, principals and teachers would operate within 
this norm to provide the individual leadership and organizational focus required in 
decision making; at BOE headquarters, professionals engaged with the norm in 
the same fashion, even though the decision making impacted children at 
distances away from the attack. 
 
In recovery, the mission of “protecting our kids” provided a clear direction as 
decision making became more complex. This complexity revealed itself as the 
depth of trauma emerged, as fiscal implications were discovered and as 
considerations of recovery for the broader community of New Yorkers dovetailed 
with those of students in the system. Effective emergency planning needs to 
incorporate the idea of establishing and maintaining organizational mission as a 
tool to guide response and recovery. 
 
2. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ADAPTATION OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES:  
Decision making during 9/11 epitomized the requirements of clearly delineating 
who is in charge, that is who takes on leadership in times of rapidly unfolding 
disaster and disrupted information and communication systems. On 9/11, in the 
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centralized, decentralized structure of the schools system, principals and 
teachers made decisions for schools near the World Trade Center because they 
knew they had to respond immediately; they were the best judges of the 
unfolding situation. Central Board decision makers, on the other hand, set 
protocols and plans into place to guarentee safety of all personnel and students 
outside the environs of Ground Zero. This sharing of “command” resulted in 
effective response on 9/11. Likewise, the approach enabled effective recovery in 
the system.   
 
The adaptation of procedures around transportation and communication are also 
notable. In transporting children safely, the OPT was able to use all its processes 
and expand them out to deal with the situation presented when New York City 
was under siege.  For communication, adaptation was not as readily seen. What 
was learned from the 9/11 experience is that levels of technology are very 
important. That is, the simplest levels, like walkie-talkies, proved a more reliant 
tool than email, phones (including cell phones)—or technology at more 
sophisticated levels. Because technology was encumbered, the BOE had to be 
innovative in how it developed its plans and how and what it communicated to 
the rest of the system and the City. As was noted, “War rooms” were established 
where teams worked together to get the most current information on 
transportation routes. The Director of Communications, curtailed rumors by 
careful and concise review of any information that was promulgated to the 
public. And, extraordinary efforts from the school-level marked the day, as a 
principal from a school at the Ground Zero walked across Brooklyn Bridge to the 
Central BOE to report that her students were safe – even as she knew her sister 
died in the collapsed Tower.  
 
3. PRIORITIZATION OF LIFE, SAFETY AND SAFE REUNION: The events of 9/11 show that 
keeping track of children, as catastrophe unfolds and as evacuation occurs, is 
quite difficult. Teachers and principals need to develop a set of protocols that 
can be used in on-the-ground decision making situations, prior to any disaster 
occurring. Furthermore, these protocols should be communicated to the 
regional/district levels as well as to parents and caregivers. High school students 
must be trained to understand that their whereabouts in conditions of disaster 
are terrifically important to school and safety officials. If these older students 
leave the scene, they ought to report to district or regional offices within a 
specified amount of time, 18-24 hours, as an example. The experience of the 
9/11 Ground Zero evacuation speaks to the merit of prioritizing orderly 
reunification information and action plans.  
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Notably, the plan for closing of schools and the safe transport of students from 
the New York City schools outside of Ground Zero was fully implemented within 
sixteen hours of the attack.   
 
4. EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL NETWORKS:  Chancellor Levy and his staff 
reached out to experts around the country within minutes of the attack on the 
World Trade Center. The experts were ready to support the BOE with the full 
content of their knowledge, experience and insight. For instance, Deputy 
Chancellor Anthony Shorris, who had been in the first World Trade Center 
bombing in 1993, called a colleague, Dr. Michael Cohen, who in Shorris’ words, 
“was literally around the corner.”  Marleen Wong, Pam Cantor and other mental 
health experts supported the BOE in the content and in the logistics of mental 
health programming (at the levels, for instance, of broad research and interfacing 
with federal/state and local agencies to finance and manage programming)   
 
Prior experience factored into the actions and thinking of leadership at BOE.  
 
Before becoming Chancellor, Levy had been with Solomon Smith Barney and had 
honed organizational leadership skills; similarly, Deputy Chancellor Shorris had 
done the same as part of the executive team at the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey. As has been noted, Shorris was also present at the 1993 Bombing 
the Towers. The BOE’s Chief of External Relations, Burt Sacks had nearly 30 years 
in the education system, including working as a teacher and principal. Bill Casey 
and Judith Rizzo had broad and extensive knowledge of curriculum development 
as well as direct experience in the field of education. Office of Pupil 
Transportation, Kevin Gill and Rich Scarpa had nearly 25 years of experience 
between them in terms of operations and transportation planning. Gill’s contact 
with the local unions, bus drivers, vendors, and other suppliers proved critically 
important in a time of system-wide catastrophe. Gregory Thomas, head of safety 
for the Board was a former assistant commissioner of the NYC Fire Department 
and had a thorough knowledge of procedures and protocol in the Department as 
well as at the Board. His contacts with the Fire Department also helped facilitate 
his interactions with the Police and by extension, the Military and FBI.  
 
The professionals who staffed student services and mental health support as well 
as community outreach and budget were dedicated, knowledgeable individuals 
each of whom brought their own unique expertise as well at their collective 




CHAPTER II - TRANSPORTATION 
 
 
The relocation and transportation of special education, primary and 
intermediary students necessarily became a chief concern of the Board of 
Education. The chapter suggests that Office of Pupil Transportation (OPT)’s 
customized tracking system was instrumental in the Board’s ability to manage 
the transportation system during a time of crisis. Likewise, the management-
staff networks supported system wide problem-solving and coordination.   
 
“I was heading into Manhattan for a Office of Emergency Management 
meeting… then I got a call to turn around and return to the Long 
Island City Office.  It took more than an hour to get back…by then all 
our phone communication was virtually useless. A lot of bus 
companies’ radio systems were located at the World Trade Center 
too. Phone and radio contact was lost with drivers. I got back just as 
the first building collapsed. I walked in and the first thing I said was 
that we all have to remember to remain calm.”   
~ BOE Official 
 
“Mr. Gill’s instructions were clear… our mission was to get our 
children home safely…” 
     ~ BOE Official 
 
RESPONSE 
The New York City Board of Education is responsible for the transport of 
approximately 170,000 students a day – 62,000 of whom are children with special 
needs – in the primary and many intermediary schools. Many of the children 
within the system have working parents and guardians who rely on after-school 
programming to coincide with their workday. Nearly 700,000 Middle and High 
school students travel by the subways and are given Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA) passes. In addition, 20% of children in New York City are from 
parochial or private schools. On 9/11, the BOE worked together with the 
leadership of the non-public schools to ensure the wellbeing of these groups of 
students. 
 
The Office of Pupil Transportation (OPT) achieved the paramount goal of 
September 11 -- the safe return of all children to their homes located throughout 
the five boroughs of New York City. OPT and BOE staff accomplished this by 
locating all the evacuated children and developing plans for transporting all other 
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children who went to school that day.57  In recovery, transportation issues would 
continue as challenges. 
 
In a system as large as that of New York City, transporting children to and from 
school happens in a number of different ways. Very soon after the first Tower 
fell, BOE officials set up a “war room” with maps and OPT’s tracking system as 
their tools of information.58 Staff of the “war room” was comprised  of BOE 
officials as well as vendors who had been asked to help think through the logistics 
of transportation in a city that had experienced an attack. As noted, the first 
plane hit at 8:46 am. By 12:25 pm, staff were sufficiently well informed to 
provide Chancellor with the details of the BOE’s plans for safe transport of all 
New York City school children. In an email entitled: World Trade Center 
Explosions II,59 Chancellor Levy laid out the plan.  He asked BOE professionals60 to 
take the following actions: use all staff to provide security; re-deploy staff from 
district offices to the schools; cancel all after school programming; and solicit the 
support of all staff in school closing. The Chancellor’s directive encompassed four 
groups of students in the closing process:  1. Children who walked to and from 
school; 2. Children who traveled by subway; 3. Children who traveled by yellow 
bus; and 4. Children, with special needs, who traveled by bus or ambulance.61 
The Chancellor’s directive laid-out the conceptual framework for the actual 
implementation of transporting children and getting them home on 9/11. 
 
First, schools would remain open under shelter conditions for children who were 
normally dismissed at the end of the day and walked home. This guaranteed 
safety until parents were able to reach them.  Second, students who traveled by 
subway were to remain at school until the transit system was fully operational.  
Third, students who used yellow bus system would be transported as usual.  In the 
instance, however, where no parent or guardian was present to meet the child as 
he/she disembarked from the bus, the student would not be dropped off.  
Instead, the child would be brought to the designated site in the district where 
she/he would remain with staff until the parent/guardian appeared. Finally, 
special education students would be transferred by their normal 
buses/ambulances and dropped off to a guardian/parent.  The complications with 
special education children, however, proved troublesome. Many of the buses and 
ambulances transporting the children were redeployed to the disaster area.  
Some children needed medical attention in a time frame that would prove shorter 
than what it took to get them home.  While this situation did not end in fatalities 
or severe injury, it nonetheless was a problem. In addition, an escort and a driver 
are required for special education children. The coordination of these personnel 
was an added consideration in the safe transport of students with special needs. 
Finally, the buses transporting students on September 11 had to get special 
 28
manifests to go into and out of Manhattan due to the shutting down of the bridges 
and tunnels.62 The Board of Education was able to account for all students, 
teachers, and staff by 1:00 a.m. on September 12, finally knowing that everyone 
was safe and unharmed.63
 
Effective management of the bus operators with the use of OPT’s tracking system 
allowed the staff to carry out their mission for the day: safely transporting 
students home. This required the re-mapping of all bus routes and constant 
communication with all schools, vendors, bus operators, and city officials.64  By 
2:49 p.m., subway and bus services were partially restored in New York City. By 
7:02 p.m., some New York City bridges opened for outbound traffic. As soon as 
the streets were passable, the OPT coordinated the bus operators to safely 
transport all students home who were still at schools and shelters throughout the 
city.  In one particular instance, a bus had to be dispatched to Jersey City where 
a church was sheltering 20 New York City students. Buses were dispatched the 
next day for these and other students who were housed in shelters. The Board of 
Education worked in conjunction with the NYC Metropolitan Transportation 




As has been noted in Chapter I, on September 12, 2001 all NYC schools were 
closed, but all district and central administrative offices were open. School 
officials had been requested to report to school to prepare for students return.  
With the exception of schools below 14th Street (or Canal; please see Timeline), 
NYC schools reopened after a two-hour delay on September 13, 2001. On this day 
as well, all after-school, evening, and Public School Athletic League (PSAL) 
programs were cancelled. From the onset, officials made the decision to have 
OPT staff operate a 24-hour hotline to address parent concerns.66 This hotline 
gave parents access to information but also calmed their fears and concerns 
about their child’s safety. 
 
The issue of transportation once again became very important in the 
reassignment of students to host schools in the aftermath of the crisis.67 Affected 
schools were relocated to other schools throughout Manhattan and Brooklyn. For 
each school that was displaced, a transportation plan was developed. OPT’s 
tracking system is a customized program of a sophisticated mapping data with 
details of a student in any given geographic location. The data can be filtered to 
locate all “special aid” children that need special equipment in order to get to 
school.68 The student’s medical needs can be matched and provide a route that 
will best transport the child home from any location in New York. This tracking 
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system was critical in the reassignment of bus routes during the chaos of 9/11. 
Bus services were revised and extended to accommodate the reassignment of 
schools. In addition, many families, who had been living near the World Trade 
Center, were displaced and children had to be picked up and dropped in different 
areas.69 Board of Education officials shuttled parents to schools to attend 
meetings and to survey the host schools.   
 
BOE officials formed a committee with parents to educate individuals about the 
different routes and update changes.70 Gathering information from the group as 
well as relying on OPT data, support mechanisms were created to facilitate the 
transport. District 2 of the school system, which was a District greatly impacted 
by the attacks provided metro cards to parents and students who needed them.  
Because of this, parents who did not want to put their children on public 
transportation alone were able to accompany them on the subway. Buses were 
the primary means of travel for primary and special education students. OPT also 
allowed for parents and siblings of special education students to ride in the buses 
with the children so that the new routes would be cause for less apprehension.71   
 
For the High school students, there was a need to work with the MTA to discuss 
bus routes and train services that students would now have to take to attend the 
reassigned schools.  Also in the months following 9/11, train lines were removed, 
reduced, or revised because of structural damages. This information had to be 
constantly relayed from the Board to students to ensure that they would be able 
to safely return to and from school.72 Additional security and school officials 
stood by the subway stations to safeguard the transference of relocated students 
to their temporary schools.73
 
OPT estimates that the direct costs incurred included the costs of 19 buses with 
indirect costs including 14 additional vehicles. Costs estimated at $400-$500 per 
vehicle74 per day, included the wear and tear on buses that had to endure longer 
routes. The 19 direct additional buses were provided for P.S. 89, P.S. 234 and 
P.S. 150. The 14 indirect vehicle costs were for the Special Education students 
who were affected by the relocation as a result of the attack.75  In addition, there 





Overall, the lesson of transportation on September 11 was that the operations 
and procedures were flexible, and therefore, highly effective under catastrophic 
response and complex recovery. OPT’s expertise was clear at a number of 
different levels, including their:  1. Technical knowledge; 2. vendor relationships; 
3. broad and specific knowledge of their student population; 4. intra and inter-
agency coordination; and  5. relationship with their constituency. 
 
1. TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE: The Office of Pupil Transportation tracking system is 
designed to transport approximately 170,000 students out of the 1.1 million total, 
on a daily basis.  The 170,000 are children in the lower grades and/or with special 
needs.  On September 11, OPT either accommodated or coordinated the transport 
of every student in the entire system (a little under one million). The Mapping 
System revealed accurate and timely information. This example of crisis 
retrofitting SOP’s is wholly noteworthy.  
 
2. VENDOR RELATIONSHIPS: OPT has successfully interacted and worked with 
suppliers of transportation with whom they contracted, as evidenced by the 
rapidity and accuracy with which information was transmitted and alternate plans 
were put into place.  They were even part of the “war-room” team that met 
throughout recovery and response. 
 
3. KNOWLEDGE OF STUDENT POPULATION: Safe and adaptable transportation plans and 
the plan for handling the closing of schools must fit together, seamlessly. The 
decision to keep schools opened allowed for the necessary time (only about 2 
hours, in the NYC example), to formulate the plan. The plan addressed the needs 
of the four types of students involved in closing, and again, normal protocol was 
shaped to meet their needs in catastrophe. The knowledge-base was already 
present and precise, and thus, integral to successful crisis-management.  
 
4. INTRA AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION: Professionals at BOE did their job 
successfully because their connections, both formal and informal, with agencies 
such as the MTA, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which is the agency 
that runs the New York City public transportation system, were secure. Clearly, 
the ground-work of these relationships was accomplished during the normal 
interactions among the professionals. The handling of September 11 response and 
recovery by OPT points to the importance of strong informal connections between 
and among agencies engaged in the transport of children throughout the system.    
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5. RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR CONSTITUENCY: Leadership of the OPT established from 
the outset that parents and children – entire families – were important to them.  
Outreach was the mantra. It was realized through: 1. setting up the process 
whereby parents, siblings  and students could all ride on the buses, until comfort 
levels were achieved; 2. establishing of a hotline for parents to call; 3. updating 
of the BOE website with information on travel routes, on consistent bases; 4. 
conducting face-to-face meetings with parents in both large and small groups; 
and 5. remaining responsive to the impact of 9/11 on displaced families, on those 
who lost loved ones, and on the general disruptions that marked relocation and 
reopening of evacuated schools. 
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CHAPTER III – FACILITIES AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
 
 
Schools became staging areas for rescue operations and emergency services.  
Schools would act as medical facilities, morgues, and shelters for rescue 
workers. Clean-up of schools closed concentrated on asbestos removal. Access 
was difficult because Ground Zero was a “crime scene” and sequestered as 
“frozen zone” by police and the military.   
 
“September 12th was a very eerie day. It was the first day I was down 
at Ground Zero- at the High School of Leadership a block away. I was 
down there- escorted by the police- the first guy from the Board. It 
was extraordinarily eerie. A day I won’t forget. The windows of the 
school were blown out. Walking around in all that paper debris. That 
was the point where I was nervous for the first time… At one point, 
an alarm went off- and I ran out of the building and ceased my survey 
of it. I had to do damage assessment. The dust. There was a sacred 
nature to it. No one was around. The recovery hadn’t fully started 
yet. It was a ghost town. It was just shocking. I was down there 
everyday for three months.” 
~ BOE Official 
 
“I was constantly dealing with army personnel, captains and names 
and social security numbers every day. Sometimes it was quick 
sometimes it was not. Hundreds of thousands of people were 
converging. Getting news was tough from down there. Security 
changed so much. Tracking down the right people was hard.”   
~ BOE Official 
 
“The fireman (a custodian) in charge of machinery said that they had 
to shut off the ventilation system so we wouldn’t breathe in the 
dust.”   
~BOE Principal 
 
The story of Facilities and Support Personnel is mostly one of recovery rather than 
response, although, certainly part of the BOE’s actions on September 11 included 
response decisions. Recovery, on the other hand, considered the following: 1. the 
impacts of use by other public sector agencies in recovery operations at Ground 
Zero; 2. the clean-up of schools that incurred damage from the collapse of the 
Towers; 3. the costs of the clean-up within the framework of the guidelines of 
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 4. the multifaceted role of 
support personnel who worked in the facilities at Ground Zero as well as in the 
maintenance of school operations at the system-wide level. It would become 
apparent that costs of the terrorist attack exceeded those deemed eligible by 
FEMA.77  BOE officials would work closely with FEMA officials in the effort to bring 
reimbursement more in keeping with actual costs.78   
 
RESPONSE 
On 9/11, as has already been noted, eight schools near the World Trade Center 
were evacuated. The school buildings were either closed or they were quickly 
occupied by public officials conducting the immediate stages of response. The 
school buildings themselves remained structurally sound with mostly windows 
blown out.79  They were, however, compromised by the significant amount of air-
borne debris making a large part of the of clean-up environmentally based.80   
While custodians had been instrumental in lessening the impact of the destruction 
on filters and airway systems when they turned off the ventilation, dust was still 
a critical problem.81 Engineers and custodians, in addition to their work for the 
BOE, also staffed buildings used in recovery to ensure structural wellbeing and 
engage in on-going maintenance. 
 
It is well recognized, in disaster planning, that schools become resources which 
can be and are often tapped into for support in response and recovery functions.  
This was certainly the case for schools on 9/11. 
 
This list below describes how the evacuated buildings were used. Enrollment 
numbers are included to indicate the scope of displacement.82     
 
PUBLIC SCHOOL 89, District 2, 201 Warren Street, Enrollment: 362 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
• Facility used as a relief center for rescue worker 
 
INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL 89, District 2, 201 Warren Street, Enrollment: 255 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
• Facility used as a relief center for rescue worker 
 
PUBLIC SCHOOL 234, District 2, 292 Greenwich Street, Enrollment: 628 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
 
PUBLIC SCHOOL 150, District 2, 334 Greenwich Street, Enrollment: 161 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
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STUYVESANT HIGH SCHOOL, 345 Chamber Street, Enrollment: 3,011 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
• Facility used as a relief center for rescue workers 
 
HIGH SCHOOL OF LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC SERVICE, 90 Trinity Place, Enrollment: 
599 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
• Facility incurred damage due to World Trade Center collapse 
• Facility used as a temporary morgue 
 
HIGH SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCE, 100 Trinity Place, Enrollment:  730 
• Facility and 730 students evacuated/school closed 
• Facility incurred damage due to World Trade Center collapse 
• Facility used as a temporary morgue 
 
PUBLIC SCHOOL 721 M, 345 Chambers Street, Enrollment: 45 
• Students and personnel evacuated/school closed 
• Facility used as a relief center for rescue workers 
 
MURRY BERGTRAUM HIGH SCHOOL, Police Plaza, Enrollment:  3,000 
• Students and personnel evacuated 
• School reopen in September  
 
RECOVERY 
In recovery, the BOE focused on getting students back in the classroom, learning 
and reclaiming a sense of normalcy in a time of upheaval.  
 
Displaced students had to be reassigned and thus, relocated to other schools 
around the city. The reassignment of schools became the responsibility of Burton 
Sacks. He and his staff identified adequate host schools, furnished additional 
desks and books, organized the schedule of classes, and sequenced the reopening 
of affected schools. He also coordinated all of these requirements with the 
departments of food services and transportation of students and staff to host 
schools. Gregory Thomas worked with Sacks in ensuring that children transported 
into unfamiliar neighborhoods were protected by plainclothes and uniformed 
police officers as well as by security officers within the schools themselves.83 (see 
Chapter I)  All of the reassigned schools, totaling 5,791 students, began classes on 
Thursday, September 20, 2002, six school days after 9/11.84 Students in Murry 
Bergtraum High School were among the 9,000 students evacuated on September 
11; however, they returned to school very soon after the event.   
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Much attention regarding schools relocation and reopening was focused on 
Stuyvesant High School, academically renowned in the City, as well as one of the 
largest on the list of schools impacted by 9/11 events.85 Stuyvesant High School 
became a staging area for recovery and relief efforts with as many as a 1,000 
people using the facility at any given time of day.86  Because it was the farthest, 
geographically, from the Twin Towers, it was also designated by Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani as the school to re-opened as the City sought a return to normalcy.87   
 
The process of relocation and reopening of schools was not without its 
controversy.  In fact, most of the criticism the Board received with regard to its 
managing of 9/11 came from the challenge of the enormous clean-up of airborne 
particulates and determining how clean was clean, and how safe was the air to 
breathe.   
 
The Board took very seriously the notion that the safest possible air quality would 
have to be proven for students to return to their schools.88 In fact, the Board 
engaged in testing that extended beyond what either insurance companies or 
FEMA indicated as necessary.89 As has been previously stated, the BOE also 
worked with the UFT and parent associations to get data from their 
independently contracted testing. (see Chapter I)  The actual process of clean up 
and re-opening of all schools impacted by 9/11 occurred from October 2001 
through to February 2002.90   
 
Stuyvesant High School reopened for classes on October 9, 2001. P.S. 150, 234, 89 
and I.S. 89 all opened Monday, February 4, 2002. The High Schools of Economics 
and Finance and Leadership and Public Service opened in early February as well.  
No media was allowed access inside the schools because the BOE was committed 
to smooth transition on the first days of reopening and return to normalcy.91
 
The BOE would realize a number of different characteristics of recovery as their 
facilities were used in capacities other than for education. For instance, Ground 
Zero was labeled a crime scene, patrolled and inspected by NYPD, FBI, and by the 
Military. Access to any facility within the area became allowable only by special 
permits. BOE officials initially had difficulty in getting to their buildings.  
Likewise, vendors (that is food and garbage removal) had to have proper 
identification.92  Garbage, its accumulation and its removal, became a significant 
cost and challenge to the BOE as relief workers from all agencies worked 
tirelessly at Ground Zero.93 Buildings had to have emergency generators, water, 
electricity, and phones in working order. Custodians were crucial to the 
maintenance of buildings. Some even slept in the schools to support rescue 
operations.94 Engineers would be needed to complete structural integrity reports.  
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Relationships with companies such as Verizon (phones), Departments of Sanitation 
and Environmental Protection as well as FEMA and the Office of Emergency 
Management were crucial.95 Vacant schoolyards would also be used – for debris 
from the site as well as for cars of the deceased left behind in garages near 
ground zero.96    
 
Finally, the recovery process highlighted the disconnect between the eligibility 
guidelines of reimbursement indicated by FEMA and the reality of costs incurred 
from a terrorist act of the scope of September 11. FEMA’s guidelines indicated 
that reimbursement was possible for activities including: 1. clean-up; 2. debris 
removal; 3. emergency response; and 4. restoration.97  Likewise, FEMA, also 
disbursed funds for hazards mitigation.98   
  
Due to the unique nature of the 9/11 event as a human-made disaster, FEMA 
challenged many costs deemed by the BOE to be limited to FEMA guidelines. For 
instance, the BOE incurred nearly $700,00099 in lost books during the evacuation.  
The Board submitted this cost for reimbursement under the guideline of 
restoration, and was denied.100 Likewise, in the effort of the hazards mitigation of 
airborne particulates, FEMA reimbursed only 5 percent of the costs, rather than 
the full 15 percent allowable under its regulations.101 As the bulk of clean-up was 
environmental, the impact to the Board was substantial. For instance, it was 
estimated that environmental clean-up costs of Stuyvesant was between $1.5 and 
1.7 million, while the costs for the High Schools at 90 and 100 Trinity 
(Economics/Finance and Public Service) approached $3 million.102 On a total 
amount of $4.7 million, FEMA was prepared to only extend support equaling 
$235,000 in contrast with a possible  $705,000, still well below the actual cost.   
BOE would find itself submitting appeals in a number of different reimbursement 
cases.103 (see Chapter VIII) 
  
ASSESSMENT 
Overall, the lesson of facilities for a complex educational system facing a 
catastrophe revealed that there would be: 1. impacts of disaster on school 
facilities; 2. use of schools for community roles in response and recovery;           
3. genuine limitations on movement and access; and 4. recognition that the role 
of support staff is very important in limiting damage.   
 
1. IMPACTS ON SCHOOL FACILITIES:  Terrorism is designed to injure or kill people and 
destroy property.  Fortunately, no school building was compromised structurally 
on 9/11.  However, given this fact, school buildings had to be quickly recast as 
areas for staging recovery operations. They became temporary morgues and 
shelters. Playgrounds stored the vehicles of those people who died in the Towers.  
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Garbage and debris would accumulate as human and recovery activity occurred.  
And, it would have to be removed.  
 
2. USE OF SCHOOLS FOR COMMUNITIES:  Core to the community’s sense of recovery, is 
the return to school and the continuation of the education process. In NYC this 
would demand a rapid relocation of several thousand students to other schools 
around the City; expectations were that students would have to learn, and that 
staff and students would work together to absorb the upheaval. This was just a 
given.  But it was a given with the backup of attention paid to the safety and 
security of unfamiliar neighborhoods and internal school environments. As with 
aspects of response, recovery involved teams of professionals working together 
for the best outcomes. Likewise, outreach to parents and community members as 
well as experts and consultants marked the planning and implementation of 
relocation.  
 
3.  LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENT AND ACCESS: Access to the geographic area impacted 
by terrorism will be limited. “Frozen zone” is defined as a crime scene where 
special identification is required. Such was the experience for BOE personnel who 
needed to be at Ground Zero to review the impacts of the attack on their schools 
and facilities. In particular, military and police are required to patrol the 
impacted area. This situation creates, at least early in recovery, limitations on 
the movement of BOE professionals. Future planning might include recognition of 
this requirement and provide for contingencies, from coordinating with the 
security ID issuers to being part of the first inter-agency teams to enter “Frozen 
Zone” sites.    
 
4. ROLE OF SUPPORT STAFF: Custodians, in particular, played an important role in 
keeping the impacts of the destruction minimized when they shut down air 
ventilation systems. They also were tremendously helpful in the maintaining of 
school facilities as they were used by recovery workers and as they were cleaned 
for relocation and re-opening of schools. Their roles were, in a nutshell, ones of 
multitasking. Recognition of the importance of in depth knowledge of the building 






CHAPTER IV – FOOD SERVICES 
 
 
The Board of Education is only second to the U.S. Army in the number of meals 
served everyday. Thirty thousand prepared meals were readied for emergency 
workers within six hours of the attack. Y2K preparations and the storage of three 
days worth of food stored for unforeseen events were crucial in the Board’s 
ability to respond quickly and effectively during this time of crisis. 
 
“Part of Y2K planning led to having a three-day supply of emergency 
food available at all times. We created a 3 day menu that was as 
shelf stable as possible- including tuna, peanut butter and jelly and 
beef ravioli. Almost every school has this- not just for emergencies 
but also for basic services. They also have a supply of frozen food to 
be used assuming there are no power outages. In preparation of Y2K, 
we thought about the need for schools to become a shelter. Red 
Cross identified other shelters, and we paired them with schools that 
could be used for food distribution.” 
~ BOE Official 
 
RESPONSE 
On 9/11 the BOE responded by preparing 30,000 meals for rescue workers and 
emergency professionals, by 2 pm on that afternoon. Throughout the crisis, Food 
Services continued to deliver an enormous number of meals; this proved essential 
to ongoing operations at Ground Zero.104   
 
Given that Y2K emergencies never occurred in 2000105 the terrorist attacks 
became the first example of Food Services’ successful administration of its 
established crisis management structure. As a part of Y2K, emergency support 
schools, consisting of 25 to 30 schools per borough, were identified on an annual 
basis to provide food and other basic services in the case of an emergency. Three 
days worth of food was stored in preparation for unforeseen events.106 In 
addition, Y2K planning had established payroll mechanisms for the nearly 8,000 
employees of Food Services.107 Shifts were established first at 12-hour intervals 
and then at 8 hour intervals, and re-assignment of food staff was a crucial 
element of smooth relocation process undertaken by the Board.108
 
On 9/11, BOE Food Services provided 30,000 meals to emergency workers within 
six hours of the attacks.109  Initially, the operation ran exceedingly well. Food 
Services was even able to provide “comfort” food, -- pastas and other 
carbohydrates—through a special order for emergency workers, firefighters and 
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police.110 Beyond the early stage of response, that is 72 hours later, Food Services 
was not wholly prepared for the duration of the emergency and maintaining the 
high level of support required. In addition, access to refrigerators and freezers 
became a problem for recovery workers in facilities taken over for recovery 
activities. Thus, locks were broken and some pantries were in general disarray, 
undermining information about the type, amount and safety of food.   
 
RECOVERY 
As more emergency personnel began to work in recovery, a new challenge arose 
in food services’ ability to manage the additional BOE workers were necessary to 
meet the demand. Similarly, there was little communication in determining who 
would staff the sites and how they would do so BOE officials noted that the 
confusion about staffing decisions arose about two days into recovery. By 
September 13, the need for food deliveries complicated matters since security 
was tight.111 Stephen O’Brien, took charge of “field activities” and was able to re-
establish control through staffing patterns and successful acquisition of 
appropriate “Frozen Zone” personal identification.112  
 
Food safety was another concern. Given that a major food-poisoning outbreak 
occurred in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the BOE was deeply 
concerned with the quality of the food. In addition, power was intermittent and 
the possibility of food spoilage became increasingly high. In spite of this, no 
outbreak of food poisoning occurred in New York City. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
Lessons learned from Food Services can be found in: 1. The educational systems 
provide food during a crisis; 2. The positive impact of Y2K in both logistics of 
staffing and the ability of the division and its staff to provide over 30,000 meals 
in a time of catastrophe; 3. the expanded knowledge base of the actual food 
requirements in recovery and response to an event such as September 11; 4. the 
importance of protection against food poisoning; and, 5. access to food storage 
and the reinforcement that education systems provide critical resources in terms 
of food during times of crisis.   
 
1. EDUCATION SYSTEM PROVIDES A CRITICAL SERVICE OF FOOD DURING CRISIS: The Board’s 
capacity to feed so many people was vital in recovery from 9/11.  School systems, 
as public sector entities, have large amounts of food and staff with the capability 
to provide mass feeding services. They are also at the front-line in any given 
geographic area hit by calamity. To be sure, the private vendors in the Ground 
Zero area provided food as recovery progressed, (e.g. Starbucks gave away 
thousands of cups of coffee, restaurants served meals, community based 
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organizations did the same) however, in early hours/days of response and 
recovery it was the BOE that had both the supplies and staff to meet the high 
demand created by 9/11. In all communities, whether rural or urban, small or 
large, schools will be present and can be counted on to fulfill this resource need. 
Contingency planning needs to recognize this ability to contribute such a resource 
in overall community emergency plan.  
 
2. POSITIVE IMPACT OF Y2K: Because of planning developed around Y2K, food 
services personnel were able to effectively take action in both the preparation 
and provision of food as well as in the tracking of those working on food services.  
The preparation and provision of food was crucial in response and the very early 
stages of recovery.   
 
Payroll systems actually provided the information base on who was available to 
work and where they were. Likewise, the system for getting checks to individuals 
on hourly wage was effective. The system may have implications for both fiscal 
and project management in crisis situations. For example, other divisions of large 
organizations may share the requirement of knowing where people are, how to 
staff-up during crisis and how to account for and process the compensation for 
crisis management work. Disruption of salaries in time of attack can add to 
general level of misery and anxiety as well as broader economic impact, and if 
possible, should be avoided.  
  
However, the BOE learned that chain of command and staffing became very 
challenging especially within the framework of providing personnel in “Frozen 
Zone” areas. This experience should alert emergency professionals to take these 
issues into account as they plan. 
 
3. EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE BASE WITH REGARD TO FOOD: A unique comment by a BOE 
Official had to do with the desire on the part of all those individuals at Ground 
Zero who worked in the tragic surroundings of 9/11. Clearly, this report is not 
intended to present insight into the chemistry of how human beings respond to 
”flight or fight” situations. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the type of food that 
was appealing to those who were engaged in the discovery and removal of bodies 
and in facing such overwhelming destruction. It is food of high carbohydrate 
content.  Plans for food storage might be deliberate in their consideration of high 
carbohydrate foods for the initial response and recovery. 
 
4. PROTECTIONS AGAINST FOOD POISONING: The experience of outbreaks of food 
poisoning during the recovery of the bombing of Oklahoma City was present in the 
minds of those responsible for the preparation and delivery of food, in New York 
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City after 9/11. There were, in fact, no such similar events for New York City – 
again a testament to the professionalism of the food services division and the 
attention to detail with which they conducted themselves. Power surges and 
interruptions will be common in the presence of wide-spread or intense 
destruction. Awareness of this constraint is important in determining type and 
amount of food supplies. 
 
5. ACCESS TO FOOD STORAGE:  Access to stores of food can be problematic in crisis 
situations. BOE Officials actually identified some changes in SOP’s (standard 
operating procedures) that could help in the future. These included: 1. having 
sets of backup keys to storage areas; 2. empowering food staff to make decisions 
when the chain of command is not present; 3. creating a system of personal 
identification that would mesh, in a much more timely fashion, with the 
requirements of securing a “Frozen Zone” after an attack or calamity. This last 
point fits into the broader overall review of coordination of the BOE as an agency 
of response and recovery along with Fire and Police Departments, FBI and FEMA. 
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CHAPTER V - COMMUNICATION 
 
Despite severe technical disabilities, the BOE did a superb job in handling the 
content and validity of the information it absorbed about the events of 
September 11, as well as what it communicated back out to the public. The 
highest levels of professionalism were maintained, with the goal to lessen 
miscommunication in crisis. As has been stated in this report and others, the 
technology of communication must be re-thought for catastrophic events.  
Appropriate levels (including “simple” devices) must be introduced into the tools 
of crisis management.  Nonetheless, the BOE is an example of how well an 
organization managed its information on 9/11.  
 
“It became a long-term effort to communicate and educate the 
parents.”  
~ David Klasfeld, Former Deputy Chancellor, Administration 
 
“As phones deteriorated, email held up. It took a day or two to come 
back.  At that point, most everything was localized.  Procedures were 
mostly meaningless.”   
~ Anthony Shorris, Former Deputy Chancellor, Management 
 
“The most significant difficulty was communicating with drivers and 
schools. We found out that parents came and got their children – 
after the fact.”   
                                         ~ BOE Official 
 
RESPONSE        
This report has addressed issues of communication in two broad areas. The first is 
in the technological interruptions and failures. The second was in the efforts to 
keep communication flowing at the operations level between individuals, within 
schools and the Board, even in the absence of working technology. This “flow” 
was made possible by individuals taking ownership of what they knew needed to 
be communicated about “keeping children safe”. Examples of this include a 
principal traveling by foot to tell BOE that all children were safely evacuated; or, 
the pulling together of staff and information in the BOE “war-room” enabling 
Chancellor Levy’s attention to precise detail and direction in the three emails he 
issued on 9/11. Keeping children safe and getting them reunited with their 
families was the underlying message that drove all communication on 9/11.   
During recovery, communication had more components; nonetheless the same 
attention to concise, clear, accurate information was present.  
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This chapter further addresses two main considerations of communication during 
the crisis for the Board: 1.) what was the communication into the Board from 
outside agencies and the public, and 2.) what was the communication from the 
Board to the public and outside agencies as well as to its own constituency. The 
content and validity of the information impacts decision making in any situation; 
in an attack, this information guides life and death decisions.  
 
Communication into the Board on September 11 came from a variety of different 
sources during the actual attack on the World Trade Center. The Board staff 
watched the unfolding of the events on television and listened to the radio.  In 
addition, information was available over the Internet. The Office of Public Affairs 
was a conduit of information from outside sources to the Chancellor’s Office as 
well as being one of the principle ways the public received information. An 
official described the flow of information on 9/11:  
 
Within 10 minutes of getting to the office, the Chancellor’s staff 
began to come together to begin to crisis manage. It was critical to 
this management to make certain that any announcements, any 
decisions were clearly and concisely communicated. Furthermore, in 
a time of chaos and fear, it was absolutely paramount that the 
messages coming through Public Affairs are consistent and accurately 
reflect the Chancellor’s decisions. Public Affairs was handling 
hundreds of calls from parents, press, and others and the very first 
decision that I made was that no one on my staff could give out 
information, without talking to me first.113 
 
The BOE maintains both a website and radio station. Both of these conduits were 
used and proved effective in reaching the public with up-to-date information, 
when it became available.114 The New York press served as a secondary 
communications outlet for the Board of Education. One BOE official remarked 
that the press conducted itself with the highest degrees of integrity during the 
crisis response.115 Finally, BOE decision makers identified very early on the 
composition of the recipients of information, and it was inclusive: BOE staff at 
the centralized and decentralized levels (i.e. teachers, principals, the UFT.); the 
students and their parents, community and faith-based organizations, related 
government and private agencies, and the general public.   
 
As has been noted, immediately after the attacks, the BOE was bombarded with 
thousands of phone calls, from concerned parents, individuals, and organizations 
seeking to donate their services.  A hotline set up with forty operators, handled 
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approximately 7,300 calls on 9/11 itself.116 These calls were also answered with 
careful attention to detail and facts with the particular effort to ensure that only 
accurate information was passed along.117 The BOE would experience 
interruptions in service with every technological method of communication – 
phones, emails, computer websites. However, they would be able to continue to 
relay important information through television, newspapers, and radio. All 
avenues of communication were always sought when information needed to be 
disseminated to constituencies.  
 
RECOVERY 
The BOE’s Office of Community Partnerships was able to reach out to Community 
and Faith Based Organizations (hereafter, CBO’s and FBO’s) during and after the 
9/11 crisis. The office identified CBO/FBO’s as playing a significant role in helping 
to manage and communicate the unfolding facts about the attack and its impact 
on the school system. On a regular basis the Office of Community Partnerships 
maintains contact with about fifty to sixty FBO’s, forty CBO’s and ten to fifteen 
After School Programs. The full cohort of community partnership organizations 
however amounts to about 8,000 throughout the City.118   
 
The structure of the relationships of CBO’s and FBO’s to the schools is that they 
represent networks within school districts, with advisory boards that work closely 
with the BOE policies and procedures affecting school children. CBO’s and FBO’s 
provide schools with both input from members of the community and a voice in 
the community from those whom the community trusts. The organizations, 
therefore, are very well versed in the nature and content of interactions at both 
the district and the central board level, capturing the decentralized nature of the 
system. They link the communities – families and children – to the educational 
system as no other entity.119
 
Information to the districts and CBO/FBO’s was communicated in a broadcast 
email at 12:43 pm on 9/11, which highlighted the Chancellor’s decisions to keep 
schools open and his request for support in reuniting children with their families.  
Throughout the day, of course, no one was certain of the number of dead or 
missing.  The CBO/FBO’s remained open well into the night, providing shelter for 
children and other people as well as working with the BOE to ensure that children 
remained in safety. The CBO/FBO’s would continue to work closely with the BOE 
throughout the recovery period, with particular focus on reporting back to the 
professionals on issues such as trauma, bias-related events, impact of the anthrax 
scare and downing of the flight in the Far Rockaways. They were, in a sense, at a 
different frontline and wholly important to accurate accounting of recovery.120
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The Board also worked with the CBO/FBO’s to sponsor local information sessions 
that focused on school safety and security, transportation, grief counseling, 
instructional strategies, and health concerns.  
 
Finally, and perhaps, most significantly, Chancellor Levy was present at Mayor 
Giuliani’s daily briefings that took place after 9/11. This direct access to the 
Mayor and his cabinet allowed Levy to inform and be informed by the 
professionals who were engaged in recovery in the other functions/operations of 
New York City. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
The lessons on communication point to the importance of: 1. validity and 
timeliness of information; 2. coordination of sources of information as well as 
groups with which information is shared; 3. knowledge that technologies will fail 
and that a matrix of information dissemination tools will be necessary. 
 
1. VALIDITY AND TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION: In chaos, clear, accurate, concise 
messages work best. A chain of command with a final point person who reviews 
information for this kind of content is quite effective in the management of 
communication during crisis. Teams should practice how this will happen when 
information is incomplete and disrupted. What type of message and at what 
intervals of timing are critical questions to be addressed and answered well 
before a disaster situation actually takes place.    
 
In addition, the validity of information promulgated from the Chancellor’s office 
was assured by Levy’s participation in Giuliani’s daily 9/11 briefings. This was 
particularly relevant in the efforts of “returning to normalcy” as signified in the 
re-opening of schools system-wide and at Ground Zero.   
 
2. COORDINATION OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION: Communication in crisis situations will 
require coordinated efforts, particularly in the presence of malfunctioning 
technology. Radio and television may be the best resource in early stages, while 
partnerships with outside organizations can assist in the longer term acquisition 
of what the impacts are revealed. As with the issue of clear and accurate 
information, the relationships with outside organizations should be fully 
developed so that when disaster happens, individuals within and outside the BOE 
know who to contact.  BOE and their partners ought to also define and practice 
the pathways of information dissemination and plan for contingency if those 
pathways are disrupted.   
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3. TECHNOLOGY FAILURE: Technological failure is assured in events of the magnitude 
of 9/11. Therefore, vigilance with regard to have a scope of technologies 
available is important to future planning – from radio to websites to even public 
address systems within the schools. Technologies must also be prepared for 
failure of electrical power over large geographic areas. Individuals and teams may 
be designated to personally carry information to prepared centers for 
dissemination via individuals or groups of individuals.  It is vitally important for all 
of us who seek an understanding of the impacts of 9/11 to remember that critical 
information was shared by individuals physically transporting their information – 
on foot – to the Central Administration of the BOE in Brooklyn.   Disaster that is 
terrorism is designed to disrupt at a number of locations and affect different 
systems. The most fundamental sharing of  information may, in some instances, 
be dependent upon people bringing messages in person, should forms of 
technology be wholly undermined or electricity outages be severe and 
widespread. All preparedness efforts need to incorporate this possibility in 
disaster planning.  
  
In addition, it is key that no emergency communication system be designed on a 
single method of communication. There must be multiple means of 
communication with each mode further based in redundancy. Likewise, power for 
communications has to come from multiple sources in the form of power back-up 
generators and/or ability to operate from batteries, as example.  
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CHAPTER VI – MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
 
In keeping with actions of other divisions, the decision makers handling the 
response and recovery around mental health reached out to experts, who formed 
The Partnership for the Recovery in New York City Schools. The impact of 
September 11 on the students in NYC is estimated to be very long term. Support 
materials were developed as well as a broadly constructed needs assessment, 
conducted. The U.S. Department of Education and FEMA provide funds for initial 
assessments. 
 
“The magnitude of the impact on the system in human terms is the 
loss of family members to (about) 1600 students and 900 staff 
members. Huge numbers of parents lost their jobs as well…no one 
can accurately measure how long trauma will last or even when it 
will first appear…post traumatic syndrome is a genuine issue and can 
be triggered three or four years later with stimulators like police and 
fire sirens…” 
  ~ BOE Official 
RESPONSE 
The attack of 9/11 occurred during regular school hours and caused immediate 
and severe psychological trauma121 for students and staff- particularly for those in 
the immediate area of the World Trade Center. During evacuation, children and 
staff saw people jumping from buildings,122 evaded falling debris, and witnessed 
the horror of the collapsing buildings.  A New York Times editorial described it in 
this way: 
 
Many of the children were screaming for their parents who actually 
worked in the towers. As one teacher stepped into the street, a 
small child saw the burning bodies falling from the tower and cried 
out, “Look, teacher, the birds are on fire! 
 
Children and staff suffered losses (approximately 1500) in their families.123 The 
Board of Education took immediate action to gather impact data on the numbers 
of schools and students affected by the disaster. This impact data was a crucial 
element in the Board’s requests for funding in response to the tragedy. 124   
 
RECOVERY 
Within a day of the disaster, the Board of Education provided its superintendents, 
principals, teachers, and staff with guidance on how to address the immediate 
needs of students. Specific recommendations and instructions were given on:     
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1. how to explain the factual details of the disaster to children; 2. how to 
reassure children of their and their families’ safety; 3. how to connect children’s 
individual grief and feelings of loss with the grief and feelings of loss of their 
communities.125   
 
Resource guides were provided to both parents and teachers that referenced 
literature on how to deal with and recognize the effects of trauma on children.  
Feedback from teachers indicates that this information was very helpful in 
enabling them to respond to the disaster effectively in their classrooms. The 
Board of Education also sent out personal letters of condolence to every family in 
the school system that lost an immediate family member.126   
 
In collaboration with the Commissioner for the New York City Department of 
Mental Health, the Board of Education solicited assistance from the mental health 
community in New York City and from around the country. Students from schools 
in the immediate World Trade Center vicinity needed expanded mental health 
services that could not be provided by existing school-based mental health 
professionals. Likewise, children system-wide were experiencing trauma and loss 
and increased services were required to support these students. The initial 
program of mental health services, funded by FEMA’s 60-day grant127, included:  
grief counseling, individual and group interventions, and the development of 
multi-disciplinary approaches to treatment by instructional and counseling staff 
within schools. Direct services to children and families were provided via a tier 
system:  school-based services referred people to community-based organizations 
and to hospitals. The Board of Education provided school districts with approved 
lists of mental health providers at community based organizations from which 
students and their families could be referred for outside services. Many mental 
health professionals offered their services pro bono to children and their 
families.128 The teacher’s unions mostly dealt with the immediate needs of 
teachers and school staff. In addition, the U.S. Department of Education, under 
the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, gave nearly 5 million to the New York 
City School System to support the efforts of mental health recovery. 
 
The Board also recognized the stressors this type of disaster put on its own staff 
and, therefore, brought in professionals from New York University to do a 
debriefing session with Board of Education personnel. Debriefing sessions were an 
opportunity for people to talk about their specific experience of 9/11, in an 
effort to help them sort out their own feelings and issues surrounding the 
tragedy.  In taking this action, the Board made sure that its own employees were 
able to respond to the immediate needs this crisis presented.  
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As in other areas of response and recovery, the BOE reached out to experts in the 
mental health field who had experience with the impact of violence on schools.  
The Children’s Health Alliance (CHMA), headed by Dr. Pam Cantor, is an advisory 
group who contracted with the BOE to coordinate mental health services through 
the Partnership for Recovery in New York City Schools. A mental health 
assessment comprised of a sample of 10,000 children from 100 schools.129 The 
results were not surprising.130 Large numbers of students exhibited symptoms 
consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder -- major depression, general 
anxiety, agoraphobia, separation anxiety, and conduct disorder.   
 
ASSESSMENT 
The lessons of the BOE’s mental health response are similar to others that have 
been revealed in the actions the Board took on 9/11. These are:  1. Engage 
experts in the design and delivery of mental health services; 2. gather data and 
information that accurately tell the story of the trauma and mental health 
impacts; 3. ensure quality control of volunteer response; 4. address Staff Mental 
Health Concerns; 5. pre-plan for mental health services; and, 6. focus on family 
centered mental health services. 
 
1. ENGAGE EXPERTS FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH RESPONSE: The BOE Student Services 
Team and the Chancellor set the tone for the mental health recovery plan from 
the very outset. They are to be commended. Their outreach to the mental health 
and trauma experts who had experience with both the Oklahoma City and the 
first World Trade Center bombings allowed for the managing of a situation which 
could have, naturally, been impacted by political and media pressures. The 
experts who comprised The Partnership for the Recovery in New York City 
Schools were also wholly engaged in the actual work of meeting the needs of 
children. 
 
Likewise, the U.S. Department of Education through ProjectSERV provided 
extremely valuable funding, at very high levels of support, ($5 million) in the 
critical post 9/11 time period. FEMA also did its part in supporting the children 
and staff in the City schools. The role of these agencies and their staffs is highly 
commendable. 
 
2. GATHER ACCURATE DATA AND INFORMATION: The team in mental health response 
and recovery knew that they needed greater insight into both the short and long-
term needs presented by the destruction and loss of 9/11. A needs assessment 
provided the appropriate tools of scientific and psychological data gathering. The 
assessment not only identified immediate areas for concern, it also set the 
framework for analysis that will anticipate problems children might encounter in 
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the future.  Finally, the assessment is an invaluable contribution to the 
knowledge base concerning the kinds of reactions human beings may experience 
in similar situations. A compilation of how the BOE is actually addressing the 
needs, modes of intervention and treatment, will also constitute a tremendous 
contribution to the knowledge on how to effectively support individuals who have 
been traumatized by events similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
 
3. ENSURE QUALITY CONTROL:  The experience of 9/11 volunteer response is 
twofold, many individuals will want to help, and that mechanisms for screening 
them is essential.  Likewise, the tools of handling in the enormous number of calls 
include: phone hotlines and a very well informed group of individuals handling 
those hotlines.   
 
4. ADDRESS MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR STAFF:  In addition to the services provided 
for students it is important to consider the needs of staff. As was done in the case 
of the NYC BOE crisis management and mental health services were made 
available to staff. 
 
5. PRE-PLAN FOR MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS TEAMS IS CRITICAL:  From the events of 9/11 
and other events of violence which have occurred at our nation’s schools it has 
become clear that events may occur in school which will require mental health 
services that exceed those normally available in schools. It is important that 
schools preplan for these events by developing relationships with consultants, 
mental heath professionals and organizations for referral to allow for the creation 
of a mental health crisis plan. 
 
6. FOCUS ON THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE FAMILY:  While providing services to the 
students is the traditional thinking, one must recognize the context of the child 
within the family. Planning for crisis mental health services needs to address the 
needs of the entire family in order to provide the support children will need. 
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CHAPTER VII - CURRICULUM 
 
The Board of Education developed a two-phase strategy for implementation of 
the curriculum dealing with the events of September 11, 2001. The curriculum 
focused on understanding the event from a number of different perspectives 
including those of a political, social and economic framework. An anti-bias 
curriculum sought to expose students to critical thinking about what it was to 
remain a community wherein diversity and difference was respected. 
 
“It is horrendous to think what could have happened in our schools 
and communities after the World Trade Center disaster, and for the 
most part, nothing did happen.  There has never been a greater sense 
of community in New York City – and the schools are very much as 
reason why this has occurred.”  
~ Bill Casey, Former Chief Executive, Division of Program 
Development & Dissemination 
 
RESPONSE 
The curricular response of the BOE involved the work of curriculum teams at the 
Board as well as groups of teachers at the district and school levels and was 
designed to provide teaching material and direction immediately after 9/11 – that 
is by the opening of the school on September 13th.  Bill Casey headed up the team 
at the Board’s office of instruction. The team would identify sources of materials, 
pull them into a cohesive whole and then add pertinent information on the topic 
of the terrorist attack. The goal of the effort in response was to develop 
materials that would foster a deeper comprehension about the events of 9/11, in 
terms of grief and loss, as well as to ward off violence toward those who were 
Muslim or appeared to be Muslim. The second set of materials dealt with the 
socio-political realities of the United States finding itself in a “war on 
terrorism”.131
 
In response, curriculum was characterized as “first phase”. The first phase had 
three goals:  
 
• To give advice to teachers on how to help students handle the grief 
and anger, while also presenting issues for discussion on terrorism 
and terrorists. An important objective, as had been stated, was to 
protect against or militate against any bias-attacks or blame directed 
at Arab-Americans. “Hate Hurts” curriculum of the Anti-Defamation 
League was used. 
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• To suggest ways to work with concepts of conflict resolution.  Faith 
Based Organizations were consulted on this part of the curriculum not 
only to develop guidelines and content but also to ask them to 
monitor any bias related events.  
• To establish a common set of definitions and language with which to 
develop a context of learning around the issues. The geography of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan was presented.   
 
All the material developed for phase one was grade sensitive, Kindergarten 
through High School.132   
 
The teachers and staff at the districts and schools accepted the responsibility of 
absorbing the curriculum and then communicating it out to their fellow 
professionals. While schools were officially closed on September 12, Chancellor 
Levy had requested that all personnel who could report to school do so.133  
Because of this, Casey was determined to present the materials within 24 hours of 
the attack. The overarching themes in the curriculum sought to enhance 
understanding of the issues as well as foster a general sense of tolerance within 
the classroom and school environments, more broadly.134 Additional reading lists 
were periodically distributed. The response of the Office of Instruction working in 
tandem with the district and schools correlated with total absence of bias activity 
reported to the Board.135   
 
The central office also sent out memos to all the teachers instructing them to 
monitor their personal behavior, as well as the students’ behavior, on issues of 
tolerance.136   
 
Casey was well aware of the multicultural challenges presented by the terrorist 
attacks. Demonstrating the same measured, well-constructed thinking that had 
marked the responses of his colleagues at the Board, Casey reached out to a 
number of nonprofit agencies, community and faith based organizations to 
construct the curriculum.137 The American Red Cross, for instance, gave Casey 
insight on how children might respond in disaster situation and what teaching 
materials met that response. The Red Cross also donated an entire set of 
resources –one for each school – that presented experiential learning 
techniques.138 Likewise, Casey contacted both the Muslim and Jewish 
communities at both a secular and non-secular level to ensure an even-keeled 
rendering of the issues in the aftermath of the World Trade Center event. The 
strategy demanded a bit more time to create and disseminate curriculum, it 
nonetheless, incorporated expert advice making for a better product(s).139    
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The collective intelligence on the impacts of disasters, both human-made and 
natural, does not reside in the marketplace. Bill Casey would note that his 
outreach to the private sector education for-profit organizations would yield no 
useful materials.140 This experience/insight impacts both the amount of and 
access to curriculum on the topic of terrorism and the pedagogical implications 
for education within the United States.   
 
RECOVERY 
After disseminating the facts of the World Trade Center attacks in the immediate 
hours (days) after 9/11 and providing a way for students to process the events 
both intellectually and emotionally, Casey and his team focused on subsequent 
stages of curriculum. These curriculum concentrated on the concepts of conflict 
management and resolution. The “language” of handling controversial issues at 
both an individual and group level was also presented. The curriculum continued 
to be grade and age sensitive and required that students “step outside 
themselves” to form a knowledge base that was both analytic and designed for 
problem solving. These features militated against the feeling of helplessness in 
the presence violence made even more unpredictable as terrorism.141 In 
retrospect, the terrorism may have actually allowed for the focusing of the 
curriculum and teaching in ways that had even more profound and lasting effect.   
 
Goals of the curriculum,142 specifically, were to be: 
 
• Effective in dealing with issues regarding the U.S./International 
response, the rhetoric regarding Osama Bin Laden, who was still a 
suspect of the bombing; the scapegoating of populations; concepts of 
war. 
• Focused on sustaining openness of discussion. This was particularly 
evident with the High School curriculum. The material used editorials 
and letters from The New York Times in the effort to illustrate the 
broad range of reactions to the events. Everything from “let’s bomb 
them off the face of the earth” to “no violence is ever justified” was 
possible and necessary in the discussion. The use of the New York 
Times enhanced students’ interest in keeping well informed as events 
unfolded.  
 
This curriculum took much longer to produce because it was vetted before an 
entire range of people both with the Board (those in charge of the social sciences 
curriculum worked on the documents) and outside. For instance, Arabic Culture 




The role of the BOE beyond its commitment to protect children, is to teach 
children.  And, for 9/11 they clearly succeeded. The lesson of curriculum is three-
fold: 1. Curriculum is a critically important component to the response and 
recovery from the educational process viewpoint; 2. curriculum development 
effort reflected the unique nature of the schools in which they are taught; 3. 
curriculum provided a conduit to continue to support the learning community on 
the unique issues of tragedy and terrorism.   
 
1. CURRICULUM IN RESPONSE AND RECOVERY: The BOE was able to support teachers 
and students by September 13, within a day of the 9/11 attacks (given that 
schools were closed on September 12) with curriculum that was both grade 
sensitive and topic sensitive. It allowed teachers to conduct their classes within 
familiar structure of lesson plans. Likewise, it offered as clear a presentation and 
analysis of what had occurred within the City and the rest of the United States, as 
was possible within a few short hours of the attacks. Although constructed 
deliberately to ward off incidents of bias, the curriculum also filled the void of 
confusion, anger and fear created by the events of 9/11 for schools, system wide, 
and arguably for the communities in which the students live. As has been noted, 
there are no reported acts of bias in the school system stemming from 9/11. 
  
As the weeks progressed, and the system entered recovery, the additional two 
phases of curriculum supported the “return to normalcy”. The presentation of 
curriculum in next two phases, furthermore, was adapted for greater learning 
outcomes. The curriculum incorporated experiential learning techniques as well 
as those of research, reading, and teamwork for optimum cognitive impact.  
Again, curriculum played an important role within the classroom setting as each 
new facet of the events of 9/11 unfolded in the media, and news.  
 
2. CURRICULUM REFLECTING UNIQUENESS: In the New York City Schools, 120 different 
languages are spoken by the children attending schools and members of the 
households from which they come. At the time of 9/11 the professionals at the 
BOE had little to draw on, in terms of curriculum for grades K-12 on terrorism and 
certainly none on the events of 9/11. The professionals at the BOE acknowledged 
this diversity and in fact, drew upon it, as they developed curriculum based on 
the events of 9/11. Furthermore, they introduced topics such as conflict 
resolution using examples that were familiar to children within the classroom. 
The curricular “fit” was an appropriate aspect of curricular development. Lastly, 
professionals followed what they set out for the rest of the educational 
community by ensuring that the curriculum was vetted before different political 
groups and community based and faith based organizations. This was important 
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for demonstrating a commitment to the processes the curriculum encouraged. On 
a pragmatic level, the sharing of and incorporating views of disparate (possibly) 
groups ensured that the learning environment would not be further disrupted by 
public/legal challenges to the curriculum.   
 
All of these experiences can be adapted to other school systems as professionals 
within them considered curriculum to address terrorism.  
 
3. CURRICULUM PROVIDING A CONDUIT:  Because we live in a “new” era of terrorism, 
the ways in which we teach our children and the manner by which we conduct 
ourselves will continue to be an important issue. The professionals of the BOE 
followed a framework that allowed for the maximum exchange of thoughts, ideas, 
knowledge to continue to militate against fear and support a true atmosphere of 
learning. It can best be summed up in the words of (former) Deputy Chancellor 
Judith Rizzo in a memo to Superintendents, entitled:  Resources for Addressing 
Issues of Tragedy and Terrorism.  She wrote:144
 
Continue to provide an honest accounting of facts and relevant 
details, clarifying any misinformation or misunderstanding students 
may have about what happened. Honesty always helps to re-establish 
a feeling of security and trust. 
 
Always build on what children already know and understand, and 
make judgments as to how much additional information to provide 
 
Let students know that it is okay to talk about unpleasant events, 
and be willing to answer questions and make them feel comfortable 
by reminding them that there are no “silly” questions. 
 
Acknowledge their fears while simultaneously reassuring them. In 
the days and weeks ahead, there will be a need to provide 
continuous reassurances to our students.  
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CHAPTER VIII - FISCAL 
 
The Board of Education engaged in unlimited spending in the hours and days 
following the attacks. FEMA required an extraordinary level of documentation 
for reimbursement.  Many costs associated with the events are not totally 
reimbursable. Our review shows that documentation of expenditures is crucial 
for reimbursement purposes. 
 
“In hindsight it was such as different experience.  There was nothing 
to base it on. We just went in and did stuff without thinking of the 
financial issue. It was really tough - FEMA rules and regulations. We 
wouldn’t have known them before but if something like this happens 
again, we’ve been through the process and we’ll be a lot better off.  
We need to share out knowledge.” 
~ BOE Official   
 
“I had to take FEMA around regarding reimbursement at the end of 
September beginning of October. Four or five times to lobby to get 
money. As time went on, we had great access. So we rotated people 
at OEM and Stuyvesant. I spent 50 percent of my time before then 
just getting people in. Getting trucks in to make repairs was hard.  
There were constant differing interests. Protecting and getting 
workers in was critical. Then there were weekly meetings at the 
Chancellor’s office.”   
~ BOE Official 
 
RESPONSE 
The Board of Education’s financial situation was strained prior to the attacks on 
9/11. The city and state 2001 budgets mandated that the Board make additional 
budget cuts and in August 2001, the Board cut $290 million without directly 
affecting classroom instruction. Thus, on 9/11 the Board was responding to the 
crisis with a limited budget. 
    
Because the Board’s goal is to provide a safe environment for their children, the 
BOE initially responded to the crisis without regard to financial implications. The 
decision was made to “clean up now and worry about expenses later.” The 
expectation was that city, state and federal resources would reimburse most of 
the spending. This actually turned out not to be the case and the Board 
conducted negotiations with FEMA on what was reimbursable.145 The Board 
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immediately designated a point person from the budget office to work with FEMA 
and other agencies.146  
 
RECOVERY 
The primary goal of the clean-up period was to ensure the safety of students 
without interrupting classroom instruction. A new coding structure for World 
Trade Center related expenses was implemented immediately in order to track 
expenditures. Costs incurred included relocation expenses, transportation 
expenses, employee overtime, physical clean up, environmental clean up, and 
the purchase of walkie-talkies for schools. Costs also included those of curriculum 
development and implementation, and mental health services. 
 
The Board is now dealing with the fiscal implications of decisions made initially to 
ensure student safety and a quick return to “normalcy”. For example, the Board 
leases the buildings where Public School 150, the High School of Economics and 
Finance and the High School of Leadership and Public Service are housed and they 
did not wait for the insurance companies to cover the costs of clean-up and 
inspections in these buildings. The Board incurred these additional costs in order 
to ensure that students could be returned to their school environment as quickly 
as possible.   
 
In October, Board officials met with representatives from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to review the rules and regulations for 
reimbursement. FEMA requires a thorough documentation of costs and 
expenditures and was only mandated to cover what was in their handbook.  
Previously, FEMA responded to natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes 
and was not prepared to handle the magnitude of the disaster on 9/11. The Board 
of Education has been working with FEMA in regards to reimbursable expenses.  
FEMA is creating new protocols as a result of this national disaster.   
 
Officials involved in the recovery from Oklahoma City bombing including Marleen 
Wong were helpful in preparing budget requests for mental health services.  
Initial funding promises for mental health initiatives came immediately after the 
attacks from FEMA ($1.3 million) through Project Liberty and from the U.S. 
Department of Education ProjectSERV funds ($5 million). (see Chapter VI)  In 
December 2001, an allocation to school districts of the initial ProjectSERV and 
FEMA money was made. Continued funding for individual, community-based 
mental health services comes from FEMA’s Project Liberty.    
 
Many of the Board’s additional costs, such as the purchasing of textbooks, 
computer hardware and supplies, personal expenses incurred by teachers for 
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school related communications, transportation costs, the loss of perishable food 
items and facility inspections, were deemed ineligible for reimbursement under 
FEMA’s current policies. The Board has applied for funding to cover their costs 
related to September 11, as well as additional reimbursement from FEMA for 
eligible claims, like teacher overtime pay, moving costs, some relocation costs, 
food delivery costs, clean-up costs, and environmental testing. The Board’s Office 
of Corporate Partnerships had also been accepting donations through its Fund for 
Public Schools - World Trade Center School Relief Fund and has received funding 
from individual donors and the private donors.   
 
An additional problem of the Fiscal process with particular reference to 
catastrophe was that the BOE system wasn’t able to quickly and easily absorb the 
money directed to them by the U.S. Department of Education. Considering that 
fiscal standard operating procedures are designed to ensure proper checks and 
protocol, the situation is understandable. Nonetheless, all organizations in time 
of recovery from catastrophe need to assess their standard operating procedures 
to ensure the highest levels of flexibility so that money can flow, prudently and 
quickly, to those who need it most.   
 
Through the process of negotiation, reimbursement requirements and protocol 
became clearer for FEMA, the U.S. DOE and the BOE. In this process two elements 
are highlighted: 1. Professionals in FEMA and at the BOE adopted an attitude of 
working through the financial challenges wrought by 9/11. Nonetheless, the 
bureaucratic structures and protocols required a flexibility that was not evident 
in the initial efforts around assessing costs and their reimbursements; and 2. 
enormous amounts of staff/professional time are required to work through the 
complexities of who would pay, how much and what would be covered; and 3.  
leadership throughout the entirety of the process is critical to effective fiscal 
management and negotiation.  
 
This report returns to fiscal questions for the final chapter. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
The lessons of fiscal response and recovery are: 1. It is appropriate, when faced 
with catastrophe, to spend as requirements and needs dictate; 2. set-up specially 
designated accounts for spending supports tracking of how money was used, but 
not what priorities emerge by way of that use; 3. the eligibility requirements of 
agencies whose mission it is to reimburse in disaster (FEMA and others) do not 
always coincide with the reality of spending and, 4.) organizations need to 
become more flexible. 
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1. SPEND AS NEEDS DICTATE IN CATASTROPHE: The Chief Financial Officer and her 
staff’s most important decision on 9/11 and throughout the crisis was to provide 
permission for spending on various needs concerning the students.147 This 
permission was given to allow the students to receive the services they needed to 
provide for their safety and well-being.   
 
2. ESTABLISH SPECIAL ACCOUNTS AND CODES: This action allowed for ease with 
tracking spending as well as the kind of back-up materials required by FEMA and 
other agencies.  In addition it helps capture costs that might be overlooked in the 
effort to provide the broadest levels of support across different functional areas 
of the BOE.  For instance, that instructional costs turned out to be a major “hit” 
to finances caused by 9/11 can be demonstrated. 
 
The accounting system should also have the ability to track and assign donations.  
Lastly the system should be discussed ahead of time with local representatives 
from FEMA and local and state disaster relief organizations. In this way these 
systems will be constructed in a manner which will maximize the potential for 
reimbursement in accordance with the rules of these funders. 
 
3. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS NEED TO BE ADAPTED: The BOE, by its experience with 
9/11 has a wealth of knowledge to share with local, state and government 
agencies about the realities and impact of catastrophic events for schools. FEMA, 
in particular, learned that it had to adapt its eligibility requirements to meet the 
need of schools as distinct in terroristic situations. On the other hand, the BOE 
discovered that the kind of fiscal flexibility required of it in times of terror is not 
fully present. This was particularly relevant in relation to the U.S. DOE and its 
efforts to give the BOE money for mental health services. Thus, the BOE’s 
experiences illustrates that it is imperative that relief agencies and organizations 
adapt their reimbursement guidelines to address the full needs of schools that 
arise from terrorism. 
 
4. ANTICIPATING HIGH COSTS AND THE CHARACTER OF ORGANIZATIONAL BUREAUCRACY: 
From the experience of the 9/11 terrorist attack it may be assumed that costs 
will far outstrip their reimbursement. Likewise there is a difference in the 
vocabulary, definitions, and regulations between budget divisions. Clarity on what 
is eligible for reimbursement may be elusive, and may require discussion and 
negotiation and ultimately an appeal or series of appeals.   
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CHAPTER IX – STUDENT SAFETY 
 
 
Our review stresses the importance of open communication between parents and 
schools as well as the need for parents to provide up-to-date contact 
information.  Additionally parents need to be aware of their children’s school 
emergency evacuation plans in order to minimize parent panic during a crisis. 
  
“A safety plan is not the plan for how you run the building; it’s a plan 
for how you prepare for and respond to emergencies. On the 11th, 
the eight schools evacuated all had each other as evacuation 
locations. We learned that backup locations are needed. Community 
involvement is critical to create concentric ‘safety circles’ around 
the schools. You don’t have to let safety stop at the school door.” 
~ Gregory Thomas, Former Executive Director Student Safety and 
Prevention Services 
 
Much of the role of safety in the response and recovery of 9/11 for the BOE has 
been covered in this report. Here, some highlights of Safety are presented within 
the context of this entire document. 
 
RESPONSE 
The New York City Board of Education has one of the most sophisticated and 
multi-dimensional safety plans to ensure the well being of its students and staff.  
All plans after approval from the Board are entered into a secure website for 
access by emergency response teams. All plans have listing of contact 
information, chain of command, detailed description of student population, 
physical layout of school, calendar of events, and daily school schedules. Careful 
yearly planning, and cooperation with other city agencies ensures the Board’s 
ability to create thorough safety and security plans. However, the events of 9/11 
called for the processes of decision making on every level to both adhere to 
planned institutional procedure as well as allow for staff to make quick decisions 
in an atmosphere of chaos. Even with safety plans in place and evacuation 
procedures well understood, specific principals and staff made the important 
decisions to break from protocol and use their judgment to lead the students to 
safety and out of harms way. Further, though not fully understanding what the 
threat was or what future threats lay ahead, principals and staff of the Board 
took calculated risks that would prove to be the difference.148
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The terrorist attack put the system under severe pressure. It was strained with 
efforts to ensure that the students and staff at Ground Zero were safe; at the 
same time it had to function to make certain that students throughout the 5 
boroughs were equally secure. Students and staff would have to navigate through 
a city shaken and literally at a stand still due to interrupted train service, bridge 
and tunnel closing and a declared state of emergency. In the days that followed, 
the Board would also have to conduct itself under conditions of: lack of 
information, bomb scares, the threat of further terrorism, potential increases in 
incidence of crime and environmental hazards.  
 
A New York City school-wide evacuation plan, in CD-Rom format, developed under 
the supervision of Burt Sacks and Gregory Thomas, is sent to the New York City 
Police Department. This plan has been established for 1,100 schools.  
Superintendents of each district also have access to the plan. The plan suggests 
evacuation routes as well as sites that schools can be evacuated to should this 
become necessary.149  
 
Of particular success were the orderly movement of students from the building 
and the steady and calm attitudes of all personnel within the schools themselves.  
Credit for this as has already been stated, is given the to the practice of fire drills 
required under the law and implemented at least twelve times annually.150     
 
The plan did not work in one capacity – that of the viability of the sites to which 
schools could be evacuated. This was precisely because those recipient sites were 
also involved in ground zero response activities.   
 
Community Based Organizations151 also played a critical role in the safe return of 
children on 9/11. CBO’s engaged in afterschool programming remained open well 
after hours, providing safe and secure settings for children.   
 
RECOVERY 
In the days following 9/11 Board of Education officials continued to monitor the 
safety situation. When relocating, school security officers were also relocated to 
assist students in locating the schools and to be a presence to reduce any possible 
incidents that might occur.   
 
ASSESSMENT  
Safety in the New York City schools is a paramount objective of the BOE.  As such, 
the dedication to it served the system very well in times of uncertainty and 
disaster, precisely because it is formulated on a decentralized basis and 
encourages “ownership” on the part of the Board Professionals within the schools 
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themselves. This ownership facilitated the on-the-ground decision making that 
resulted in the wellbeing of students and personnel who were in harm’s way at 
Ground Zero. Important aspects of student safety involves: 1. Involving other 
relevant agencies in the development of safety plans  2.  Redundancy is integral 
to safety planning  3.  Safety Plans should allow for crisis leadership  4. Student 
Safety and Accountability  5.  All Hazards Planning  6. Incident Command and 
Incident Management this can be assured. 
 
1. INVOLVE OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY PLANS: It is 
important that all relevant agencies including law enforcement, fire service, EMS, 
public health and emergency management at a minimum are both involved in the 
development of school safety plans and their evaluation.   
 
2. REDUNDANCY IS INTEGRAL TO SAFETY PLANNING:  School safety plans should allow for 
multiple approaches to handle situations. This will allow for alternatives should 
an initial approach fail or become unavailable.   
 
3. SAFETY PLANS SHOULD ALLOW FOR CRISIS LEADERSHIP:  In the end those at the scene 
must be empowered and trained to make independent decisions. Information and 
communication is often limited and those present will have to make independent 
decisions in times of crisis. Preplanning and training should allow for this.   
 
4. STUDENT SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: As the schools are responsible for the care 
and safety of the children entrusted to them, school safety plans must include the 
priorities of assuring student safety under all events and providing multiple 
methods of accounting for the whereabouts and status of all children during an 
event. This should be a repetitive process and include the process for release of 
students into the care of their parents and others in the absence of their parents 
including documentation and communication of these events.   
 
5. ALL HAZARDS PLANNING:  As history has shown time and time again one can never 
predict the variability of events which can occur. As such safety plans should take 
an all-hazards approach to allow adaptation and planning for any event which 
may occur.   
 
6. INCIDENT COMMAND AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: It is important the school safety 
plans be able to interact with the plans of other agencies and the community 
wide plans. In order to facilitate this cross agency collaboration and connection 
common terminology and approach is imperative. By using the common principles 




CHAPTER X - CONCLUSION 
 
 
 “No one is ready for something like this…” 
       ~ Harold O. Levy, 
Chancellor 
 
With respect, perhaps it would be fair to question the Chancellor Levy’s 
conclusion.  For the fact is that an enormously complex institution, charged first 
with the safety of its constituent members, in an unprecedented catastrophe, 
responded at an incredibly high level of performance. They did so through the 
utilization of intelligently crafted plans and systems; and where these were 
inadequate or unavailable, through courageous decisions and actions from the 
leadership and ground-level professionals.   
 
The factual story assembled here reveals that the professionals in the echelons of 
New York City education were indeed ready to cope with the unimaginable and 
they did so without casualties and that the recovery of the educational system 
was conducted with speed and intelligence. This is a remarkable story, 
understated in its drama, because the professionals did what they were trained to 
do and supplemented their training with calm intelligence in handling the 
unforeseen.  
 
The institutional culture, which universally spoke of “our kids” rather than “the 
kids”, is the first notable characteristic of the response on 9/11. It pervaded 
decisions throughout the day and well into recovery phase.  
 
There are really two stories here: the immediate response to the crisis on 9/11, 
and the subsequent steps in the recovery of the system. In the latter category, 
recovery, one is struck with the immediacy of the corrective actions taken:  
Timely mental health guidance and propagation in the first hours, curriculum 
development within the first 24 hours, financial guidance intelligently ignoring 
crisis costs but capturing the extraordinary elements of the disaster within hours.   
 
Prior planning and systems were crucial in the complexity of student 
reassignment and alternate transportation arrangements. Routine fire drills were 
credited with the maintenance of composure and speed of evacuation.  
Rehearsals and planning for Y2K were invaluable, especially in maintaining a 
feeding capability and food quality. OPT’s tracking system was crucial in 
supporting reassignments.  
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 But, performance in the heat of battle is the most compelling story.   
 
Evacuations were carried on with self-reliance and courage in the face of 
incomplete information and unknown consequences. Safety of “our kids” was 
paramount and the goal was achieved. The “stay open decision” was key and the 
subsequently stressed transportation system performed excellently, aided by 
competent management.   
 
Facilities management moved immediately to preserve building access with 
timely attention paid to ventilation and food management, affording 
irreplaceable bases for police, fire, military, medical and volunteer personnel. 
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most compelling lesson is that in a crisis of this 
magnitude, it is inevitable that communications will fail in this sprawling a 
complex. Recommendations for triplicate facilities, enhanced media 
dependencies, and the like cannot totally correct for this exposure. The answer 
then, is that there must be an expectation of intelligent response on the ground 
by people who have been trained in what is expected of them. This is the key to 
future planning – the continued ultimate reliance on dedicated professionals. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is a list of 10 recommendations that emerge from the case study of 
the BOE. While these are not an all encompassing list of recommendations for 
emergency preparedness they are those which have emerged from the interviews 
conducted and this case study. 
 
1. Review the Y2K protocol developed by schools. This review can provide 
insights into the emergency planning and reveal resources which exists 
and can be used for general emergency preparedness. The case of the Y2K 
planning for the New York City BOE involved many functional and 
operational areas that allowed BOE professionals to effectively respond to 
and recover from the event of 9/11. Information databases, payroll 
guidelines, and chain of command are all issues to review.  
2. Communicate safety plans, with evacuation sites and plans for 
reunification, with parents and community groups. In this way, 
information is available in contingency, and, parent and community 
groups can be of assistance with these functions. 
3. Plan for disaster food services by considering the number of days for the 
resupply of food. At a minimum this should be 3 days. Planning for 
disaster food services should also account for the role school food services 
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may play as mass feeding facilities for emergency personnel and the 
community. 
4. Share with other emergency responders the complete safety plans and 
involve them in the planning process. The sharing of these plans should 
include all elements including items such as any information contained in 
the Tracking and Transportation System, food service planning, health 
care, facilities planning, communications, evacuation, student safety and 
accountability. 
5. Consider at least three redundant systems of communication, 
incorporating both simple and sophisticated forms of technology. 
Coordinate these systems with that of the emergency response agencies 
to assure interoperability and ability to communicate with them. 
6. Weave the function of schools becoming a locus of response and recovery 
in catastrophe into overall public sector planning for emergencies. This is 
important because schools have the resources of mass feedings and 
shelter facilities, for example, in times of disaster. 
7. Acknowledge the important role of custodians and building engineers in 
evacuation, plan to work with contractors and vendors when developing 
contingency crisis management situations. 
8. Consider that there will be unforeseen costs and that in an effort to 
provide for the needs of children these should be allowed. These costs can 
range from garbage removal to lost instruction time. 
9.  Ensure that a process of communicating with the media in times of 
catastrophe is in place well before an event. Provide for a single and 
approved source of information to prevent conflicting messages and 
confusion. Timely and accurate information is the cornerstone of proper 
public information in times of crisis. 
10. Develop training and protocol for personnel at the centralized and 
decentralized levels that captures and reinforces the core lesson for the 
BOE of 9/11, critical decision and leadership skills are needed by those at 
the scene of the event and in charge of the school system. As was evident 
for the BOE, nothing substitutes for the on-the-ground decision making 




CHAPTER XI – 9/11: TWO YEARS LATER 
 
 
Post 9/11, questions remain about recovery in the schools as well as how the 
system would be able to react to any new catastrophe. 24 months after 9/11, 
this chapter serves as a testament to a community and its resiliency as found in 
the story of students, teachers and staff at a High School at Ground Zero. It also, 
however, offers a perspective that at least at the systems level, the lessons of 
9/11 may not be fully absorbed, or even fully articulated. This perspective is at 
once, both a caution and a call to action. It suggests that we do not know 
enough, we have not shared our information enough, and we are not prepared 
enough to counter the threats of the day.  We need to alter this situation.  
 
“We didn’t get back to this building until five months later. The 
entire nation and city still felt the insecurity and fear. Fear is 
debilitating, destructive. Hope and a reason for living—that’s got to 
be your purpose.  Sure we were afraid. Every time we heard a truck 
go over the metal plate or siren we’d get anxious. But we were 
already a tight community. A community of people with the same 
mission—what’s best for the kids. We already support and respect 
each other. We also understood each other and that we were all in 
the same place, we had experienced the same thing and gotten each 
other through.”   
~ Ada Dolch, Principal, High School of Leadership and Public Service 
 
“Personally, for me, it’s got to be about the mission of keeping kids 
safe – always. The assumption that what’s good for adults is good for 
children, is not the assumption to make. Terrorism has the potential 
for such destruction. Schools may not be the direct target, 
nonetheless, they will be greatly impacted. If schools are the direct 
target, it could be tragedy beyond our ability to bear. We need to be 
better prepared… much better prepared than we are now.”   
  ~ Gregory Thomas, Director, National Center for Disaster 
Preparedness 
 
It is useful to able to look back at the events of 9/11 with an intention of learning 
what has happened, for both good and bad, since that Tuesday morning in New 
York City, 2001. The material in this chapter is based on the re-interviews of a 
Principal and the former Director of School Safety for the Board of Education.   
 
 67
Ada Dolch is the Principal, dedicated to her students and staff at the High School 
of Leadership and Public Service at what is now Ground Zero. Gregory Thomas 
worked as the Director of Safety for the Board of Education on 9/11. In July 2003, 
he transitioned from the Department of Education of New York City to the 
National Center for Disaster Preparedness, the Mailman School of Public Health, 
Columbia University. Mr. Thomas is now engaged in efforts at the local, state and 
national levels to encourage disaster preparedness for the most vulnerable 
populations, in particular, children. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will present in greater detail the issues that are 
represented by each interviewee. Dolch and Thomas recounted the highlights of 
events over the past twenty-four months; and, each offers thoughts on what 
should be shared for purposes of developing knowledge. Ada Dolch has focused on 
recovery within a school community; while Gregory Thomas offers his thoughts on 
preparedness and the conditions that allow for optimum achievement therein.   
 
This knowledge base integrated into schools and school systems across the nation 
will inform our preparation for and response to terrorism as well as to disaster of 
any other kind.   
 
 Ada Dolch is the Principal of the High School adjacent to the World Trade Center, 
now Ground Zero. She epitomized the decisiveness of decision makers on 9/11 
who moved quickly to get children to safety on a day of massive destruction that 
by any estimation could have ended in causality. The first question to Principal 
Dolch was how did she decide to move so decisively and begin to evacuate her 
students even though safety protocol suggested otherwise:  
 
On that day, I drew from my experiences, growing up as a kid in the 
Lower East side. It was a tough neighborhood and I was always 
taught to be respectful…to walk away from the problem. On 9/11, I 
kept thinking if and when there is a problem, you go away from it.  
My intuition told me two things: One, I am not putting my kids in the 
basement and two, we’ve got to get out of here. 
 
Dolch described her approach to decision making as primarily based on: 1. moving 
all in her building away from danger and, 2. relying on her assessment of the 
situation at the scene rather than following protocol that did not fit the situation; 
3. conducting herself with total focus – that is without any interruptions by phone 




I saw from my window that there were literally things flying out of 
the Tower. I immediately thought that the debris could fall on our 
building and the resulting worse case scenario would be a fire. This 
building is 14 stories high and it has narrow halls and stairways. It 
would take time to evacuate so I thought the sooner we got started 
the safer it would be. I called HQ once and they questioned my 
decision to evacuate. But that was the last time I used the phone.  I 
decided that I can’t spare the time to wait for decisions, I couldn’t 
afford the distraction.  I stayed off of the phones so that I could stay 
focused on the task at hand. I stayed in contact with my staff and 
Security Agents via the walkie-talkies. 
 
Dolch had also equipped her school with walkie-talkies over the years that she 
had been Principal. Setting aside approximately $900 from her budget, each 
budget cycle, Dolch afforded herself and staff the necessary means of 
communication in a vertical, multilevel building. Furthermore, all the walkie -
talkies had the same channel as the NYPD walkie-talkies so that Dolch was as 
informed as police as events unfolded.    
 
I have purchased two to three high quality, NYPD approved walkie-
talkies, for the past 8 years. Each one costs $800-$900 and it comes 
out of my OTPS.  But I order two or three a year, depending on our 
budget, so that we are prepared for anything. They are not 
cheap…they get the job done. There is one for every floor and my 
key staff -- Deans, School Aids, Guidance Counselors have them.  
When I can’t reach people via the intercom speaker, I use the 
walkie-talkie…We used them on 9/11.   
 
Another of Dolch’s notable actions was the way that she actually conducted the 
evacuation.  Because the school year had just started, Dolch was preparing to 
conduct her first fire drill.152 While her staff and teachers were practiced in 
evacuation, several new students had not experienced one – at least not in their 
new High School environment. Because of her thorough understanding of the 
building, as well as her awareness of the proximity of the High School of 
Economics and Finance, Dolch orchestrated the steady and orderly evacuation.  
People flowed out of opposite sides with immediate movement away from the 
edifices into the street at the front of the buildings, south to a safer area.  
Groups of students walked immediately to tip of Manhattan Island near the 
Hudson River, at Battery Park. Ten minutes after all the students and staff 




Ada Dolch attributed her decision making skills to a number of different 
ingredients. The first was her characterization of the requirement to lead:  
 
When you are the responsible one, you have to be proactive in 
decision making as opposed to reactive in decision making. You plan, 
review, practice and go back and fix the problems. And you do this 
over and over. I am ultimately responsible for the well being of my 
kids and my staff. I put everything else aside to ensure this.  I want 
to always be in what Stephen Covey calls the second quandrant153 
where things can be important but not urgent because I planned for 
it.  
 
The second was the fundamental ability to establish a leadership style that set 
the tone for the organizational culture within her school. As has been evident 
with all the interviews conducted for this report, Dolch communicated the 
commitment to her students: 
 
Keep kids safe and they will be able to learn. Every single member of 
my staff has to have the very same commitment. That’s how I 
operate before, during and after 9/11…  
 
Dolch also pointed to training and education she received as a third element of 
her decision making. She cited the importance of her own mentoring as well as 
role-playing in a decision making required of a principal: 
 
I went to the Principals’ Institute at Bank Street and I took a 6 
month sabbatical to play the role of principal. I chose a school in Far 
Rockaway. It was at that school that I first saw a Principal use a 
walkie-talkie. The situation in the school was that a student had a 
gun on the premises. Access to the communication over the walkie-
talkie was invaluable that day and was one of the reasons the 
Principal was able to act quickly and decisively.  
 
A fourth element Dolch identified is staff preparedness, specific to individual 
responsibility in any time of crisis or threat. As with the overall readiness that is 
found through the practice of fire drills, Dolch and her staff have also worked 
together to know and understand how each individual staff member will take up a 
specific job, thereby achieving a coordinated effort. Dolch explained:   
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There is a secret statement in this school – which I will not share 
with you. However, periodically I ask my staff when I am in meetings 
– what do you do, what are your responsibilities if that secret 
statement comes over the walkie-talkie? I don’t ask them if they 
know that statement – I assume that they do. I want to know that 
they know what to do when I make the statement.   
 
Dolch cautioned, however, that in her opinion, the safety plans are too 
cumbersome and lengthy. She believes that viable safety plans must be genuine 
tools of management within the schools. Currently, she would suspect that the 
plans are submitted and then not used because of their length. Dolch also 
believes that the current administration at the DOE is dedicated to the safety of 
school children, but believes that because of the retirement of key personnel 
involved in 9/11 as well as professional who transitioned to other jobs, the 
knowledge base is compromised:  
 
I believe we all want the same thing but the DOE is reactive rather 
than proactive much of the time. I believe that they want to keep 
kids safe, but they don’t know what it means. Everyone that was 
involved with 9/11 has left… You know, there is a reason why we 
have grandfathers and grandmothers. They have wisdom, 
experience, history and that we can trust.  We can learn from them 
for difficult situations. When there are no “Grandmas and Grandpas” 
we just don’t have the same level of knowledge. A school safety plan 
means very little when push comes to shove. A forty page, safety 
plan sometimes faces the danger of being put on the “shelf” as 
opposed to being a useful and functional document. Safety plans 
need to be a third of what they are now…Everyone should know 
his/her job.   
 
The High School of Public Service, comprised of a student body that is diverse 
ethnically, racially and socio-economically, was relocated after 9/11. The 
community of students and teachers did not return to their school building for 
nearly six months. Dolch had a unique insight on the recovery taking place within 
the community of a school. She pointed out that activities around public service 
reinforce the strength of the community, and that, at least in the instance of her 
High School healing came from activities of public service. Unlike in other 
schools, students in the High School of Public Service did not participate in 
counseling in any widespread manner.  Dolch explained:  
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The counseling services were fantastic for those students who could 
use them…counseling is not wholly applicable to my kids…My kids are 
Black, Hispanic, Chinese – they don’t come from a culture of using 
counseling…     
 
Dolch recounted the unique way in which the members of her school – teachers 
and children effectively coped with the trauma of 9/11. The community engaged 
with each other around collective activity designed to help others.    
 
Some teachers were knitting and the students asked them to teach 
them how to knit.  Forty kids started a club – girls and boys.  The 
conversations started as everyone—30, 40, 50 kids at a time, 
teachers staff-- was knitting.  We talked through the pain as we 
made blankets, shawls, baskets.  We made them for people in 
homeless shelters, and nursing homes. Then we put it on the Website 
and people started to donate yarn and other materials, and we made 
more.  
 
The purpose of doing something collectively as a community for the benefit of 
others fit well with the mission of the High School of Public Service. The process 
of learning by doing and civic engagement was actually familiar to the students 
because the curriculum incorporates such approaches in its pedagogy. However, 
within the context of 9/11, all of this had extra poignancy, extra significance. 
 
I will say that my kids learned what leadership and public service are 
really all about. They learned that you heal best when you do 
something for someone else. My kids and my staff learned something 
profound. We learned that as a community when we help others we 
helped, we healed, ourselves.   
 
Dolch pointed out that even as the community was healing within itself, her role 
as advocate within the school system would increase. Some of the eight schools at 
Ground Zero, most notably, Stuyvesant High school received more publicity than 
other schools. Parents were vocal and the media was focused as were groups and 
corporations wanted to donate money. Dolch commented that the issues like 
those of language and socio-economics rendered barriers for parent action at her 
school.  
 
The parents of my kids want the best for their children… but in many 
instances they don’t know what they need to ask for… for many of 
 72
them, English is their second language…in the end advocacy for my 
school came because I focused on it, my staff focused on it.  
  
As has already been noted, it would take the high school of Public Service nearly 
six months before it could return to its building at 9 Trinity Place. The school had 
been used as a morgue; because the fires at Ground Zero burned for 99 days154 
making air quality unsafe, air and elevator shafts, stairwells, hallways, 
classrooms, and other assembly places had to be thoroughly cleaned before the 
students and teachers could return. Dolch noted: 
 
I went around to the cleaning company – which was actually named 
KISS-- and said to them, “when I can kiss these walls and floors, then 
I know your job’s done…” 
 
The support from the Board of Education during this time was intermittent as it 
worked to effect recovery for the all eight schools as well as returning the entire 
system to normalcy. Dolch, in retrospect would have welcomed more support 
from the Central offices and the publicity of the media, but indicated that 
Chancellor Harold Levy reached out wholeheartedly to support Dolch and the High 
School once he was fully apprised of needs there. Likewise, Gregory Thomas, then 
Director of School Safety was instrumental in inviting the New York Giants 
Football team members to spend a day with the students. In addition, donations 
of computers, a holiday party fund as well as money for general recovery were 
made to the high school. For all of these efforts and actions, Dolch expressed her 
appreciation.   
 
In extraordinary times, having the attention of celebrities can really 
help morale – particularly in light all the celebrity focus after 9/11.  
My kids, like all kids, wanted to be a part of being recognized. And, 
of course, the gifts in computers and donations really helped. I am 
very thankful for all of the help.  
 
On a final note, Ada Dolch is a woman who spoke of  her own personal beliefs as 
being pivotal to her ability to respond as she did during the 9/11 attacks and 
afterward in the recovery stages. On 9/11, while Ada Dolch was engaged in the 
efforts to ensure that all students and teachers were safely evacuated, Dolch’s 
sister, Wendy, died in Tower One. Dolch was fully aware that her sister didn’t 
survive the attack because Wendy worked on the floors above the fire. When 
asked about her ability to handle her loss and remain effective in her professional 
capacity, Dolch explained…  
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It was the fourth day of school; I didn’t really know my kids yet. We 
evacuated. I wanted to get over to 110 Livingston to tell them at 
Central that everyone was OK. One little girl, a freshman came up to 
me and said, “I am so scared, Mrs. Dolch, I am so scared”. She 
grabbed my arm and didn’t let go.  We held on to each other and we 
sang songs as we walked across the Brooklyn Bridge… She was my 
angel that day… She was a Muslim girl. How could I be angry? How 
could I hate?  
 
In all of her actions, Dolch conducted herself as a leader whose primary 
responsibilities included the wellbeing of her students and staff. Her management 
style was based on her nuts and bolts of what it is to run a complex organization 
as well as a focus on contingency planning. Her decision making skills like her 
other colleagues at the Board of Education, were certainly informed by 
experience. However, her decisions on 9/11 were not informed by experience of 
catastrophe because 9/11 is without precedent. Instead, Dolch, mirroring the 
actions of other colleagues at the BOE, responded to the unprecedented nature of 
the World Trade Center attacks and stepped outside of protocol to ensure safety 
and wellbeing. Even in recovery, Dolch engaged with her community on the basis 
of who they were and what they needed as unique and specific. Where protocol 
was appropriate, Dolch made use of it. Where protocol fell short, Dolch worked 
with her colleagues to achieve the most effective outcomes for her students and 
staff.  This discernment and flexibility go beyond what experience offers and are 
the cornerstone of her management style.155    
 
Gregory Thomas has over twenty years of experience in law enforcement and 
safety. Prior to directing the BOE’s Office of Student Safety, Thomas was an 
assistant commissioner at the Fire Department of New York City. In July of 2003, 
Thomas became the Director of the Program for School Preparedness and Planning 
at The National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP), Mailman School of 
Public Health, Columbia University. Since 9/11 he has been asked by public safety 
and education officials to share his thoughts on how school systems need to think 
about school safety in an era of terrorism.   
 
Thomas commends the actions of his colleagues in New York on 9/11 and has 
worked to both disseminate the knowledge gained from the 9/11 events, 
nationwide as well as engage professionals in discussion about the issues. Still, 
Thomas sees gaps in most school systems’ ability to respond to similar 
catastrophic events. For him, prevention and preparedness (the two p’s) allow for 




An intense focus on “P2R2” is what every system needs to address the 
threats we now face.  We have to go after this with an attitude that 
terrorism will happen again. It is not the question of if anymore, but 
the questions of what the next event is going to be. By preparing for 
the “imaginable” we prepare for the “unimaginable”.  
 
In this theme of preparing for the imaginable, Thomas points to a number of 
different areas that school systems and districts can develop right now. 
 
Deeper and more professional ties with emergency management officials.  
The allocation of appropriate budgets to the departments within School systems 
responsible for safety.  This needs to include a consideration of a moratorium on budget 
cuts for a 2-3 year period, so as to ensure the financial support for adequate training and 
re-tooling of the professionals as well as emerging staffing needs. 
The development of training materials tailored for groups such as: principals and assistant 
principals, teachers, staff and children.  The materials for children, of course, would be 
age sensitive.  
The capture of information and sharing of knowledge on a coordinated basis by those 
individuals directly involved in 9/11 as well as in other school based disasters, like school 
shootings.  Typically, information is shared within professional groups, but not across them 
and not on a consistent basis.  
The engagement of parents, community and civically based organizations in planning and 
preparedness with specific reference to their role in ensuring the safety and wellbeing of the 
school populations.    
 
Gregory Thomas begins his assessment of the lessons learned from 9/11 by 
pointing to an action taken by the Board of Education in 1998. In 1998, 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Board of Education and the 
NYPD outlined the criteria by which the function of school security, including the 
recruitment, training and deployment of security staff was transferred from the 
Board of Education to the NYPD. Thomas negotiated with the NYPD on the 
specifics of the MOU with particular reference to fine tuning specifics for a school 
environment. For instance, the finalized version of the MOU included the protocol 
for search and seizure within a school as well as what constituted an area of 
responsibility for school safety agents and police officers within the environs of 
the school. This specifically meant that safety agents would seek to maintain a 
safe environment for students both within the school building as well as within 
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the “line of sight” of the building where students might take their 
altercations/assaults. (Thomas is currently authoring a case study with guidelines 
on MOU’s between police and school systems for dissemination nationwide).  
 
Thomas believes that the agreement which existed between the Board of 
Education and the NYPD was critical to the safe evacuation of students from 
Ground Zero. On 9/11, 80 school safety agents actually knew the Schools at 
Ground Zero – knew where they were and who was in them. The officers were 
immediately dispatched to the Schools and were able to provide support to the 
evacuating school populations. Perhaps even more importantly, these agents were 
able to make schools a priority when catastrophe makes for so many priorities to 
be considered. This was particularly evident in the relationship Thomas had 
developed and then counted on during the recovery period which started for 
Thomas on September 12, the very next morning after the attacks. Thomas was 
able to gain access to Ground Zero because of his relationship with the NYPD and 
began to report back to his colleagues at the Board of Education the extent of 
damage, and fortunately, the physical wellbeing of students, teachers and staff.  
In a time of great upheaval and misinformation, this kind of managerial 
reconnaissance is important to helping systems have a greater balance in reactive 
vs. proactive decision making.  
 
The cost of catastrophe as terrorism is a huge one. The dollar value attributed to 
the loss of life, the impact on the human psyche as well as the loss of property 
and possessions and impact on commerce amounts to billions of dollars.  With this 
in mind, Thomas cites the importance of appropriate financial support to the 
departments responsible for safety in schools. The budgetary considerations, in 
the post 9/11 era, have expanded from meeting the requirements of keeping 
students safe from school violence, something that has always been a part of the 
mission, to keeping kids safe in a chemical or biological terrorist attack. What this 
means is additional training and educating as well as staffing for the departments 
who are responsible for safety.   
 
During tough fiscal times, agencies are often asked to reduce their operating 
budgets. Many of these reductions require that school districts look deeply within 
their budgets to come up with cuts to meet the established goals. When the cuts 
can’t be avoided, Thomas cautions that educational leaders take steps to avoid 
making them in the area of safety and security, because the cuts can have 




It is true that most times education as an agency is exempt from 
wholesale budget cuts. However, once the money is in the 
educational agency it is not true that security is exempt. This is the 
opposite of what should be happening. Staff needs to be re-trained 
on the specifics of disaster, for instance, what do you do with a 
bomb, what do you do with a sniper, what do you do with a chemical 
attack, what do you do with all three at once in different parts of 
the city? 
 
For Thomas, the requirements of security demand much more financial support 
with out spectre of budget cutting. In fact, he believes that budgets should be 
enhanced or at least maintained for a 2-3 budget cycles. Since budgets are made 
on a yearly basis for the New York City Schools, this translates to a stable budget 
over the next three years. The cost for learning how to planning and prevent is 
far lower than the costs of not learning. In most municipalities, public safety 
agencies like fire and police are exempt from large budget cuts because of their 
importance to the vitality and stability of their town or city. With the move to 
integrate police services into the school environment, schools need to be mindful 
of their increased role to prevent incidents. This increased role translates into 
developing and maintaining programs from those designed to reduce student 
violence to those that prepare stakeholders for disaster or acts of terror.   
 
Likewise, Thomas notes that the most schools are not fully aware of the impact of 
catastrophe on instruction. For the New York City Schools, $47 million was finally 
designated at the amount that was spent to help make up for lost instruction.  
This amount encompassed not only the time lost in instruction on 9/11, but also 
the weeks afterwards when processing of the attack would necessarily interrupt 
scheduled curriculum. Thomas also noted members of the United States House 
and Senate from New York State worked together to  influence FEMA to expand 
the definition of  eligibility to reimburse for lost instruction time. He recalls that 
this political influence eased the FEMA/BOE negotiation at a critical juncture. 
Thomas notes that other schools systems might be more effective in their 
planning by understanding how and when to engage political decision makers in 
policy management  
 
Schools, by virtue of their physical plant – their bricks and mortar -- will and 
should be used as the operations buildings in response and recovery. Thomas 
recounted that the U.S. Military, FBI, Firefighters, Police, FEMA, and other 
emergency/police personnel used the school buildings throughout response and 
recovery. School professionals need to understand that the costs here will be high 
and many costs will be unforeseen. For example, New York City school officials 
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discovered that school property like shovels, wheel chairs, first aid equipment 
had been used by personnel during rescue and recovery. These items, 
understandably, were not returned to school property and had to be replaced.  
Schools because they have food, generators, and equipment and large rooms and 
auditoriums will be used as morgues, shelters, staging areas, operations centers.   
All of these roles have a price tag. 
 
Thomas recalls that his colleagues were astute in setting up a specific disaster 
account(s) for tracking costs associated with 9/11, noting that FEMA can audit, 
currently, for up to four years.   
 
Thomas is also concerned with the organizational culture he feels is the norm in 
the most school systems. It is a culture of reaction, not prevention, reinforced by 
policing where the emphasis is on intervention. 
 
Right now, our security approach…by nature and by design is that of 
crisis intervention. We need to figure out how to be more pro-active, 
strategic. The entire planning component of security for the school 
system needs to be based on prevention… This shift in organizational 
culture has to occur at the centralized and decentralized levels, 
everyone involved needs to shift in their thinking and in their 
actions. I am not saying that this will be easy or fast, I am saying 
that it is necessary….   
 
In the post 9/11 period, Thomas would like to see much more information sharing 
on the potential threats and responses as well as the specialized training in 
readiness for those responsible for school safety. Thomas has observed that 
professional groups have been actively engaged in sharing information with each 
other, but not necessarily in a coordinated fashion across professional groups.  
For instance, personnel from the Office of Emergency Management or Police and 
Fire, may or may not consistently engage with education or school safety 
officials; it is similar with Police, Firefighters and school safety officials. This 
intermittent or nonexistent interaction becomes important when one considers 
the protection of children as a vulnerable population in disaster planning and 
preparedness. Thomas observes:  
 
When emergency management or public safety officials come 
together to plan for large scale disaster or conduct tabletop 
exercises or drills, school officials are often not included. At the 
very least, the emergency management team is not informed by 
those personnel who deal with their own “little disasters” everyday.  
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In the worst case scenario, this unfortunate omission can result in 
serious injury or death for children who are exposed to the disaster.   
School officials can also be helpful in the disaster planning dialogue 
because schools become the locations of evacuation and response.  
The schools are self-sustaining entities that contain food, water, 
equipment and free standing methods of communication… 
 
The last point of the lessons learned from 9/11 is the requirement for 
communication between and among the member of the school system as well as 
with parents. This group is comprised of the professionals from the office of 
school safety, but also very importantly, superintendents, principals, assistant 
principals, teachers and parents as well as where appropriate, the students 
themselves. One tool to begin to develop an information base to be shared in 
what Thomas has identified as a “registry of care”. This comprehensive data base 
would be put together by the schools within the communities, first and then 
woven into a larger data base for use by in the central school administration.  
Thomas cites the extraordinary work of his colleagues at the BOE during the 
response and recovery phases of 9/11 where thousands of volunteers were 
screened within a 24 hour period. (see  Chapter I) An expansion of the experience 
on 9/11 would not only maintain a current database but it would also by design 
engage stakeholders of safety and security namely professionals within and 
outside the school system as well as parents and students. 
 
When a large scale emergency or disaster strikes, the care that is 
provided to the staff and children must be well thought out and 
delivered quickly.  In New York City, we learned that the numbers of 
people who will emerge to lend a hand after a disaster numbered in 
the thousands.  It is extremely important that the persons chosen to 
provide care to children during a disaster are credentialed, 
experienced and sensitive to the needs of children. The time to 
determine one’s merit and ability to provide care is not during a 
disaster but well before a disaster happens. Pre-established 
“registries of care” can go along way to efficient and effective 
delivery of care… 
 
Thomas, in his ability to look at the larger picture of readiness in school systems 
offers an insight on what professionals might do on a collective and holistic basis.  
Thomas also cites a recent study done by the NCDP and the Marist Institute for 
Public Opinion, wherein findings indicate that in general, the respondents have no 
confidence in government to protect them in a terrorist attack. Being able to 
engage in productive sharing of information as well as coordinating the best 
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thought processes on how to provide safety for school children by all the agencies 
involved would go along way in mitigating this fear.   
 
This chapter on 9/11, twenty four months later is intended to provide insights not 
readily achievable in the more immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center 
attack. It is also intended to highlight the unique nature of response and recovery 
for schools inasmuch as that uniqueness requires specific planning and prevention 
for catastrophe.    
 
The question becomes, what can be learned from 9/11 and from the New York 
City School system given considerations of the budget, the school community, and 
the organizational framework? We have already learned that while experience is 
useful, it has only partial utility in unprecedented situations. The recounting of 
the story of 9/11 and the Board of Education tells of individuals who focused on 
the events and who in that focus dismissed protocol and thus, made the right 
decisions. Indeed had protocol been followed, outcomes would have been very, 
very different and possibly tragic for the schools.   
 
What has emerged from this story are examples of how to deal with the 
unexpected with effective decision making. To aggregate information around the 
areas of  school community and intra, inter-organizational structure can guide 
other school systems and professionals. Some of what follows may seem just like 
common sense. But, as the part of the title of this paper suggests, common sense 
is often uncommon -- and implementing the ideas presented here requires the 
same kind of dedication that was present on 9/11 in the minds and actions of the 
educational professionals.   
 
The school as a community and the leadership required to support that 
community is captured in the role of a Principal as “captain of the ship.”156  This 
description is apt because of its comprehensive nature. Ada Dolch’s effective 
dealing with catastrophe meant a lot of things were in place by virtue of her 
management:   
 
1. A leader who saw a situation, assessed it and engaged in on-the-ground 
decision making for the purpose of maintaining the well being of all in her 
responsibility.   
2. A thorough knowledge of the physical layout – including basement --  of 
the vertical building that housed the school that informed the evacuation 
plan and implementation  
3. Tools of communication linked into police channels, as well as being 
appropriate for staying in contact when telephones and PA systems went 
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down.  The walkie-talkies also allowed for coverage and rapid assessment 
of the situation throughout the entire building  
4. A well informed and talented professional staff to implement evacuation  
5. Well developed evacuation plan that had been practiced; language and 
codes whose meaning is known only to the professionals in the school 
6. A disciplined group of students who knew how to follow directives and 
directions who supported each other in responding to the order to evacuate 
7. A leader who advocated on behalf of her community.  This included the 
educational and psychological wellbeing of students and staff as well as the 
renovation of the physical plant—the building – which housed the school.  
Likewise, the leader reached out to those colleagues at both a policy and 
political level, as their decision making would have an impact on her 
community, both short and long term. 
 
Gregory Thomas’ perspective suggests two significant themes for educational 
organizations: that educational leadership needs to pay attention to and be fully 
engaged using the budget as a tool to guide them in their planning about 
catastrophe: and that they must pay careful attention to their engagement with 
professional safety and security groups.    
 
First, looking at the budget as a tool of understanding catastrophe offers 
overarching themes about catastrophe and schools.   
 
All catastrophe will have costs that require tracking; all catastrophe will present unforeseen 
costs. 
Schools will take on a general public sector role in disaster and that role may be have short 
or long duration, or mixed, depending upon the size and scope of the disaster. 
Educational processes will be impacted and interrupted, always. Recovery will include lost 
instruction make-up and the associated costs of programming. 
Negotiation on what schools will pay for out of operating budgets and what federal, state 
and local agencies will cover is likely.  Political intervention may be warranted.  Problem-
solving, however, will happen at the policy and management levels of organizations. 
Productive relationships rather than adversarial ones allow for expedient and effective 
decision making.  
 
 
Tracking from a budgetary point of view means account set-up and management.  
Establishing special accounts for disaster expenditures and teaching decision 
makers about how to use the accounts is crucial. The record keeping, assessment, 
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feedback, and auditing will continue for many months after a human made or 
natural disaster.  FEMA can audit up to four years; therefore all those involved in 
financial/budgetary management – at the central administration, district and 
school levels – have to remain vigilant about accuracy. 
 
As schools move back into their primary role of education, the cost of lost 
instruction becomes significant. Lost instruction extends well beyond the 
immediate event of catastrophe, depending upon the proximity. Should school 
systems choose to make up this lost instruction, formulas that measure actual 
time lost and the cost of it will have to be calculated. If feasible, schools should 
make up lost instruction in the same academic year, and make it mandatory.  
Engaging non-public schools in the lost instruction time programming benefits all 
school children and is part of the calculated costs. Avoiding weekends and 
vacation periods to implement instruction makeup, is encouraged. 
 
Lastly, the financial negotiations required of school systems and decision makers 
in the aftermath of catastrophe are complex. This is due in part to the estimating 
of costs as well as the defining of categories of reimbursement that may or may 
not be different from those developed by the agencies who reimburse. Because of 
the nature of 9/11 and the work of the professionals of the New York City 
Schools, FEMA has a deeper understanding of the needs of educational recovery.    
Professionals would be wise to converse with each other well before possible 
catastrophe presents itself. Such professionals include: chancellors, 
superintendents, principals, from the schools as well policy makers and 
department heads from FEMA and the U.S. Department of Education and 
Homeland Security. Budget directors, deputy directors, auditors from both 
schools and the government agencies ought to be included in these groupings.  
Regularized contact would help develop the working relationships critical to 
effective response and recovery in disaster.   
 
Thomas’ exposure to the effective interaction with the Police Department of New 
York occurs well before the catastrophe of 9/11. His approach to that relationship 
begins from the fundamental premise that children learn when they feel safe. A 
school culture of safety and prevention is critical to safe environment of learning.  
This approach requires a pro-active assessment, interpreting possible sources of 
violence and mitigating them before they can be activated. It is a different kind 
of thinking and requires different sets of questions to asked and to be answered: 
 
What are the requirements of a relationship between police and schools?  
What are the requirements of the central administrations of the PD and the Schools (Police  
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Headquarters and the Chancellor/Director of Student Safety)  
How do these requirements fit with the schools? With principals, teachers and professional 
staff?  With schedules, with curriculum delivery? With the size of population and the 
location of schools? 
How do changes in school policy or policy system-wide ripple out to the PD?  How is it  
communicated?  How are unforeseen consequences considered?  
How and when do we revisit the relationship between schools and PD?  How is it monitored 
and changed, if needed? 
What does it mean to be an officer of the law within a school environment?  How do police  
conduct themselves in a closed, contained environment with populations in close quarters? 
How is decision making shared between the chief executive of school safety and the chief  
executive of the PD? 
What are the considerations of the above questions in situations of terror or violence within 
and outside of a school, schools or school systems?  
What mechanisms are in place to communicate the specifics to emergency management, law  
enforcement and security officials/professionals? 
What mechanisms are in place to communicate the specifics to school professionals in other  
areas – like transportation and food services --  parents, caregivers, media?  
 
Notably, educational professionals can ask the very same questions when 
establishing and reviewing their relationships with Fire, Emergency Response 
personnel and with safety professionals at the local state and federal levels. 
 
In this new era, Thomas points to the need for professional within the education 
system to be fully engaged in the development of anti-terrorism planning and 
preparedness as well as response and recovery. This is particularly critical 
because the populations of individuals within schools systems are children and 
they are vulnerable in ways that are different from the adult populations. This 
work may take the form of contracting out services of student safety for the 
school systems as well as the development of relationships with professionals that 
cut across the spectrum of safety in general. Identification of what is needed is 
dependent upon the unique characteristics of schools systems.  Thomas urges that 
what ever the size and scope of the system, that school officials begin to think 
about these questions – and others that emerge in consideration of the unique 
characteristics of their own schools – now. Likewise, he speaks to his colleagues 
within the professional safety community to embrace the notion of schools as 
 83
unique in their safety requirements and as unique in their contribution to anti-
terror preparedness and prevention. It is not just the idea that everyone needs to 
be at the table, it is actually the idea that everyone needs to build a whole new 
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4. Deputy Chancellor for Management & Policy 
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The successful decision making of the key Board personnel at the centralized and 
decentralized levels may be described by four factors: 1. Motivation to protect all 
people in the school system; 2. delineated chain of command and adaptation of 
standard operating procedures; 3. prioritization the life, safety and the safe 
reunion of children with parents; and 4. effective use of formal and informal 
networks to enhance institutional knowledge of recovery and response.  
 
1. MOTIVATION TO PROTECT: The professionals at the Board of Education operated 
under an organizational cultural norm of “protecting our kids.” As events 
transpired on 9/11, at Ground Zero, principals and teachers would operate within 
this norm to provide the individual leadership and organizational focus required in 
decision making; at BOE headquarters, professionals engaged with the norm in 
the same fashion, even though the decision making impacted children at 
distances away from the attack. 
 
In recovery, the mission of “protecting our kids” provided a clear direction as 
decision making became more complex. This complexity revealed itself as the 
depth of trauma emerged, as fiscal implications were discovered and as 
considerations of recovery for the broader community of New Yorkers dovetailed 
with those of students in the system. Effective emergency planning needs to 
incorporate the idea of establishing and maintaining organizational mission as a 
tool to guide response and recovery. 
 
2. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ADAPTATION OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES:  
Decision making during 9/11 epitomized the requirements of clearly delineating 
who is in charge, that is who takes on leadership in times of rapidly unfolding 
disaster and disrupted information and communication systems. On 9/11, in the 
centralized, decentralized structure of the schools system, principals and 
teachers made decisions for schools near the World Trade Center because they 
knew they had to respond immediately; they were the best judges of the 
unfolding situation. Central Board decision makers, on the other hand, set 
protocols and plans into place to guarantee safety of all personnel and students 
outside the environs of Ground Zero. This sharing of “command” resulted in 
effective response on 9/11. Likewise, the approach enabled effective recovery in 
the system.   
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The adaptation of procedures around transportation and communication are also 
notable. In transporting children safely, the OPT was able to use all its processes 
and expand them out to deal with the situation presented when New York City 
was under siege.  For communication, adaptation was not as readily seen. What 
was learned from the 9/11 experience is that levels of technology are very 
important. That is, the simplest levels, like walkie-talkies, proved a more reliant 
tool than email, phones (including cell phones)—or technology at more 
sophisticated levels. Because technology was encumbered, the BOE had to be 
innovative in how it developed its plans and how and what it communicated to 
the rest of the system and the City. As was noted, “War rooms” were established 
where teams worked together to get the most current information on 
transportation routes. The Director of Communications, curtailed rumors by 
careful and concise review of any information that was promulgated to the 
public. And, extraordinary efforts from the school-level marked the day, as a 
principal from a school at the Ground Zero walked across Brooklyn Bridge to the 
Central BOE to report that her students were safe – even as she knew her sister 
died in the collapsed Tower.  
 
3. PRIORITIZATION OF LIFE, SAFETY AND SAFE REUNION: The events of 9/11 show that 
keeping track of children, as catastrophe unfolds and as evacuation occurs, is 
quite difficult. Teachers and principals need to develop a set of protocols that 
can be used in on-the-ground decision making situations, prior to any disaster 
occurring. Furthermore, these protocols should be communicated to the 
regional/district levels as well as to parents and caregivers. High school students 
must be trained to understand that their whereabouts in conditions of disaster 
are terrifically important to school and safety officials. If these older students 
leave the scene, they ought to report to district or regional offices within a 
specified amount of time, 18-24 hours, as an example. The experience of the 
9/11 Ground Zero evacuation speaks to the merit of prioritizing orderly 
reunification information and action plans.  
 
Notably, the plan for closing of schools and the safe transport of students from 
the New York City schools outside of Ground Zero was fully implemented within 
sixteen hours of the attack.   
 
4. EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL NETWORKS:  Chancellor Levy and his staff 
reached out to experts around the country within minutes of the attack on the 
World Trade Center. The experts were ready to support the BOE with the full 
content of their knowledge, experience and insight. For instance, Deputy 
Chancellor Anthony Shorris, who had been in the first World Trade Center 
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bombing in 1993, called a colleague, Dr. Michael Cohen, who in Shorris’ words, 
“was literally around the corner.”  Marleen Wong, Pam Cantor and other mental 
health experts supported the BOE in the content and in the logistics of mental 
health programming (at the levels, for instance, of broad research and interfacing 
with federal/state and local agencies to finance and manage programming)   
 
Prior experience factored into the actions and thinking of leadership at BOE. 
 
Before becoming Chancellor, Levy had been with Solomon Smith Barney and had 
honed organizational leadership skills; similarly, Deputy Chancellor Shorris had 
done the same as part of the executive team at the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey. Shorris was also present at the 1993 Bombing the Towers. The 
BOE’s Chief of External Relations, Burt Sacks had nearly 30 years in the education 
system, including working as a teacher and principal. Bill Casey and Judith Rizzo 
had broad and extensive knowledge of curriculum development as well as direct 
experience in the field of education. Office of Pupil Transportation, Kevin Gill 
and Rich Scarpa had nearly 25 years of experience between them in terms of 
operations and transportation planning. Gill’s contact with the local unions, bus 
drivers, vendors, and other suppliers proved critically important in a time of 
system-wide catastrophe. Gregory Thomas, head of safety for the Board was a 
former assistant commissioner of the NYC Fire Department and had a thorough 
knowledge of procedures and protocol in the Department as well as at the Board. 
His contacts with the Fire Department also helped facilitate his interactions with 
the Police and by extension, the Military and FBI.  
 
The professionals who staffed student services and mental health support as well 
as community outreach and budget were dedicated, knowledgeable individuals 
each of whom brought their own unique expertise as well at their collective 




Overall, the lesson of transportation on September 11 was that the operations 
and procedures were flexible, and therefore, highly effective under catastrophic 
response and complex recovery. OPT’s expertise was clear at a number of 
different levels, including their:  1. Technical knowledge; 2. vendor relationships; 
3. broad and specific knowledge of their student population; 4. intra and inter-
agency coordination; and  5. relationship with their constituency. 
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1. TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE: The Office of Pupil Transportation tracking system is 
designed to transport approximately 170,000 students out of the 1.1 million total, 
on a daily basis.  The 170,000 are children in the lower grades and/or with special 
needs.  On September 11, OPT either accommodated or coordinated the transport 
of every student in the entire system (a little under one million). The Mapping 
System revealed accurate and timely information. This example of crisis 
retrofitting SOP’s is wholly noteworthy.  
 
2. VENDOR RELATIONSHIPS: OPT has successfully interacted and worked with 
suppliers of transportation with whom they contracted, as evidenced by the 
rapidity and accuracy with which information was transmitted and alternate plans 
were put into place.  They were even part of the “war-room” team that met 
throughout recovery and response. 
 
3. KNOWLEDGE OF STUDENT POPULATION: Safe and adaptable transportation plans and 
the plan for handling the closing of schools must fit together, seamlessly. The 
decision to keep schools opened allowed for the necessary time (only about 2 
hours, in the NYC example), to formulate the plan. The plan addressed the needs 
of the four types of students involved in closing, and again, normal protocol was 
shaped to meet their needs in catastrophe. The knowledge-base was already 
present and precise, and thus, integral to successful crisis-management.  
 
4. INTRA AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION: Professionals at BOE did their job 
successfully because their connections, both formal and informal, with agencies 
such as the MTA, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which is the agency 
that runs the New York City public transportation system, were secure. Clearly, 
the ground-work of these relationships was accomplished during the normal 
interactions among the professionals. The handling of September 11 response and 
recovery by OPT points to the importance of strong informal connections between 
and among agencies engaged in the transport of children throughout the system.    
 
5. RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR CONSTITUENCY: Leadership of the OPT established from 
the outset that parents and children – entire families – were important to them.  
Outreach was the mantra. It was realized through: 1. setting up the process 
whereby parents, siblings  and students could all ride on the buses, until comfort 
levels were achieved; 2. establishing of a hotline for parents to call; 3. updating 
of the BOE website with information on travel routes, on consistent bases; 4. 
conducting face-to-face meetings with parents in both large and small groups; 
and 5. remaining responsive to the impact of 9/11 on displaced families, on those 
who lost loved ones, and on the general disruptions that marked relocation and 
reopening of evacuated schools. 
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FACILITIES AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
 Overall the lesson of facilities for a complex educational system facing a 
catastrophe revealed that there would be: 1. impacts of disaster on school 
facilities; 2. use of schools for community roles in response and recovery;          
3. genuine limitations on movement and access; and 4. recognition that the role 
of support staff is important.   
 
1. IMPACTS ON SCHOOL FACILITIES:  Terrorism is designed to injure or kill people and 
destroy property.  Fortunately, no school building was compromised structurally 
on 9/11.  However, given this fact, school buildings had to be quickly recast as 
areas for staging recovery operations. They became temporary morgues and 
shelters. Playgrounds stored the vehicles of those people who died in the Towers.  
Garbage and debris would accumulate as human and recovery activity occurred.  
And, it would have to be removed.  
 
2. USE OF SCHOOLS FOR COMMUNITIES:  Core to the community’s sense of recovery, is 
the return to school and the continuation of the education process. In NYC this 
would demand a rapid relocation of several thousand students to other schools 
around the City; expectations were that students would have to learn, and that 
staff and students would work together to absorb the upheaval. This was just a 
given.  But it was a given with the backup of attention paid to the safety and 
security of unfamiliar neighborhoods and internal school environments. As with 
aspects of response, recovery involved teams of professionals working together 
for the best outcomes. Likewise, outreach to parents and community members as 
well as experts and consultants marked the planning and implementation of 
relocation.  
 
3.  LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENT AND ACCESS: Access to the geographic area impacted 
by terrorism will be limited. “Frozen zone” is defined as a crime scene where 
special identification is required. Such was the experience for BOE personnel who 
needed to be at Ground Zero to review the impacts of the attack on their schools 
and facilities. In particular, military and police are required to patrol the 
impacted area. This situation creates, at least early in recovery, limitations on 
the movement of BOE professionals. Future planning might include recognition of 
this requirement and provide for contingencies, from coordinating with the 
security ID issuers to being part of the first inter-agency teams to enter “Frozen 
Zone” sites.    
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4. ROLE OF SUPPORT STAFF: Custodians, in particular, played an important role in 
keeping the impacts of the destruction minimized when they shut down air 
ventilation systems. They also were tremendously helpful in the maintaining of 
school facilities as they were used by recovery workers and as they were cleaned 
for relocation and re-opening of schools. Their roles were, in a nutshell, ones of 
multitasking. Recognition of the importance of in depth knowledge of the building 





Lessons Learned from Food Services can be found in: 1. The educational system 
provides food during a crisis; 2. The positive impact of Y2K in both logistics of 
staffing and the ability of the division and its staff to provide over 30,000 meals 
in a time of catastrophe; 3. the expanded knowledge base of the actual food 
requirements in recovery and response to an event such as September 11; 4. the 
importance of protection against food poisoning; and, 5. access to food storage 
and the reinforcement that education systems provide critical resources in terms 
of food during times of crisis.   
 
1. EDUCATION SYSTEM PROVIDES A CRITICAL SERVICE OF FOOD DURING CRISIS: The Board’s 
capacity to feed so many people was vital in recovery from 9/11.  School systems, 
as public sector entities, have large amounts of food and staff with the capability 
to provide mass feeding services. They are also at the front-line in any given 
geographic area hit by calamity. To be sure, the private vendors in the Ground 
Zero area provided food as recovery progressed, (e.g. Starbucks gave away 
thousands of cups of coffee, restaurants served meals, community based 
organizations did the same) however, in early hours/days of response and 
recovery it was the BOE that had both the supplies and staff to meet the high 
demand created by 9/11. In all communities, whether rural or urban, small or 
large, schools will be present and can be counted on to fulfill this resource need. 
Contingency planning needs to recognize this ability to contribute such a resource 
in overall community emergency plan.  
 
2. POSITIVE IMPACT OF Y2K: Because of planning developed around Y2K, food 
services personnel were able to effectively take action in both the preparation 
and provision of food as well as in the tracking of those working on food services.  
The preparation and provision of food was crucial in response and the very early 
stages of recovery.   
 
 100
Payroll systems actually provided the information base on who was available to 
work and where they were. Likewise, the system for getting checks to individuals 
on hourly wage was effective. The system may have implications for both fiscal 
and project management in crisis situations. For example, other divisions of the 
large organizations may share the requirement of knowing where people are, how 
to staff-up during crisis and how to account for and process the compensation for 
crisis management work. Disruption of salaries in time of attack can add to 
general level of misery and anxiety as well as broader economic impact, and if 
possible, should be avoided.  
  
However, the BOE learned that chain of command and staffing became very 
challenging especially within the framework of providing personnel in “Frozen 
Zone” areas. This experience should alert emergency professionals to take these 
issues into account as they plan. 
 
3. EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE BASE WITH REGARD TO FOOD: A unique comment by a BOE 
Official had to do with the desire on the part of all those individuals at Ground 
Zero who worked in the tragic surroundings of 9/11. Clearly, this report is not 
intended to present insight into the chemistry of how human beings respond to 
”flight or fight” situations. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the type of food that 
was appealing to those who were engaged in the discovery and removal of bodies 
and in facing such overwhelming destruction. It is food of high carbohydrate 
content.  Plans for food storage might be deliberate in their consideration of high 
carbohydrate foods for the initial response and recovery. 
 
4. PROTECTIONS AGAINST FOOD POISONING: The experience of outbreaks of food 
poisoning during the recovery of the bombing of Oklahoma City was present in the 
minds of those responsible for the preparation and delivery of food, in New York 
City after 9/11. There were, in fact, no such similar events for New York City – 
again a testament to the professionalism of the food services division and the 
attention to detail with which they conducted themselves. Power surges and 
interruptions will be common in the presence of wide-spread or intense 
destruction. Awareness of this constraint is important in determining type and 
amount of food supplies. 
 
5. ACCESS TO FOOD STORAGE:  Access to stores of food can be problematic in crisis 
situations. BOE Officials actually identified some changes in SOP’s (standard 
operating procedures) that could help in the future. These included: 1. having 
sets of backup keys to storage areas; 2. empowering food staff to make decisions 
when the chain of command is not present; 3. creating a system of personal 
identification that would mesh, in a much more timely fashion, with the 
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requirements of securing a “Frozen Zone” after an attack or calamity. This last 
point fits into the broader overall review of coordination of the BOE as an agency 
of response and recovery along with Fire and Police Departments, FBI and FEMA. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
The lessons on communication point to the importance of: 1. validity and 
timeliness of information; 2. coordination of sources of information as well as 
groups with which information is shared; 3. knowledge that technologies will fail 
and that a matrix of information dissemination tools will be necessary. 
 
1. VALIDITY AND TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION: In chaos, clear, accurate, concise 
messages work best. A chain of command with a final point person who reviews 
information for this kind of content is quite effective in the management of 
communication during crisis. Teams should practice how this will happen when 
information is incomplete and disrupted. What type of message and at what 
intervals of timing are critical questions to be addressed and answered well 
before a disaster situation actually takes place.    
 
In addition, the validity of information promulgated from the Chancellor’s office 
was assured by Levy’s participation in Giuliani’s daily 9/11 briefings. This was 
particularly relevant in the efforts of “returning to normalcy” as signified in the 
re-opening of schools system-wide and at Ground Zero.   
 
2. COORDINATION OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION: Communication in crisis situations will 
require coordinated efforts, particularly in the presence of malfunctioning 
technology. Radio and television may be the best resource in early stages, while 
partnerships with outside organizations can assist in the longer term acquisition 
of what the impacts are revealed. As with the issue of clear and accurate 
information, the relationships with outside organizations should be fully 
developed so that when disaster happens, individuals within and outside the BOE 
know who to contact.  BOE and their partners ought to also define and practice 
the pathways of information dissemination and plan for contingency if those 
pathways are disrupted.   
 
3. TECHNOLOGY FAILURE: Technological failure is assured in events of the magnitude 
of 9/11. Therefore, vigilance with regard to have a scope of technologies 
available is important to future planning – from radio to websites to even public 
address systems within the schools. Technologies must also be prepared for 
failure of electrical power over large geographic areas. Individuals and teams may 
be designated to personally carry information to prepared centers for 
dissemination via individuals or groups of individuals.  It is vitally important for all 
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of us who seek an understanding of the impacts of 9/11 to remember that critical 
information was shared by individuals physically transporting their information – 
on foot – to the Central Administration of the BOE in Brooklyn.   Disaster that is 
terrorism is designed to disrupt at a number of locations and affect different 
systems. The most fundamental sharing of  information may, in some instances, 
be dependent upon people bringing messages in person, should forms of 
technology be wholly undermined or electricity outages be severe and 
widespread. All preparedness efforts need to incorporate this possibility in 
disaster planning.  
  
In addition, it is key that no emergency communication system be designed on a 
single method of communication. There must be multiple means of 
communication with each mode further based in redundancy. Likewise, power for 
communications has to come from multiple sources in the form of power back-up 
generators and/or ability to operate from batteries, as example.  
 
 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
The lessons of the BOE’s mental health response are similar to others that have 
been revealed in the actions the Board took on 9/11. These are:  1. Engage 
experts in the design and delivery of mental health services; 2. gather data and 
information that accurately tell the story of the trauma and mental health 
impacts; 3. ensure quality control of volunteer response; 4. address Staff Mental 
Health Concerns; 5. pre-plan for mental health services; and, 6. focus on family 
centered mental health services. 
 
1. ENGAGE EXPERTS FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH RESPONSE: The BOE Student Services 
Team and the Chancellor set the tone for the mental health recovery plan from 
the very outset. They are to be commended. Their outreach to the mental health 
and trauma experts who had experience with both the Oklahoma City and the 
first World Trade Center bombings allowed for the managing of a situation which 
could have, naturally, been impacted by political and media pressures. The 
experts who comprised The Partnership for the Recovery in New York City 
Schools were also wholly engaged in the actual work of meeting the needs of 
children. 
 
Likewise, the U.S. Department of Education through ProjectSERV provided 
extremely valuable funding, at very high levels of support, ($5 million) in the 
critical post 9/11 time period. FEMA also did its part in supporting the children 




2. GATHER ACCURATE DATA AND INFORMATION: The team in mental health response 
and recovery knew that they needed greater insight into both the short and long-
term needs presented by the destruction and loss of 9/11. A needs assessment 
provided the appropriate tools of scientific and psychological data gathering. The 
assessment not only identified immediate areas for concern, it also set the 
framework for analysis that will anticipate problems children might encounter in 
the future.  Finally, the assessment is an invaluable contribution to the 
knowledge base concerning the kinds of reactions human beings may experience 
in similar situations. A compilation of how the BOE is actually addressing the 
needs, modes of intervention and treatment, will also constitute a tremendous 
contribution to the knowledge on how to effectively support individuals who have 
been traumatized by events similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
 
3. ENSURE QUALITY CONTROL:  The experience of 9/11 volunteer response is 
twofold, many individuals will want to help, and that mechanisms for screening 
them is essential.  Likewise, the tools of handling in the enormous number of calls 
include: phone hotlines and a very well informed group of individuals handling 
those hotlines.   
 
4. ADDRESS MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR STAFF:  In addition to the services provided 
for students it is important to consider the needs of staff. As was done in the case 
of the NYC BOE crisis management and mental health services were made 
available to staff. 
 
5. PRE-PLAN FOR MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS TEAMS IS CRITICAL:  From the events of 9/11 
and other events of violence which have occurred at our nation’s schools it has 
become clear that events may occur in school which will require mental health 
services that exceed those normally available in schools. It is important that 
schools preplan for these events by developing relationships with consultants, 
mental heath professionals and organizations for referral to allow for the creation 
of a mental health crisis plan. 
 
6. FOCUS ON THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE FAMILY:  While providing services to the 
students is the traditional thinking, one must recognize the context of the child 
within the family. Planning for crisis mental health services needs to address the 





The role of the BOE beyond its commitment to protect children, is to teach 
children.  And, for 9/11 they clearly succeeded. The lesson of curriculum is three-
fold: 1. Curriculum is a critically important component to the response and 
recovery from the educational process viewpoint; 2. curriculum development 
effort reflected reflects the unique nature of the schools in which they are 
taught; 3. curriculum provided a conduit to continue to support the learning 
community on the unique issues of tragedy and terrorism.   
 
1. CURRICULUM IN RESPONSE AND RECOVERY: The BOE was able to support teachers 
and students by September 13, within a day of the 9/11 attacks (given that 
schools were closed on September 12) with curriculum that was both grade 
sensitive and topic sensitive. It allowed teachers to conduct their classes within 
familiar structure of lesson plans. Likewise, it offered as clear a presentation and 
analysis of what had occurred within the City and the rest of the United States, as 
was possible within a few short hours of the attacks. Although constructed 
deliberately to ward off incidents of bias, the curriculum also filled the void of 
confusion, anger and fear created by the events of 9/11 for schools, system wide, 
and arguably for the communities in which the students live. As has been noted, 
there are no reported acts of bias in the school system stemming from 9/11. 
  
As the weeks progressed, and the system entered recovery, the additional two 
phases of curriculum supported the “return to normalcy”. The presentation of 
curriculum in next two phases, furthermore, was adapted for greater learning 
outcomes. The curriculum incorporated experiential learning techniques as well 
as those of research, reading, and teamwork for optimum cognitive impact.  
Again, curriculum played an important role within the classroom setting as each 
new facet of the events of 9/11 unfolded in the media, and news.  
 
2. CURRICULUM REFLECTING UNIQUENESS: In the New York City Schools, 120 different 
languages are spoken by the children attending schools and members of the 
households from which they come. At the time of 9/11 the professionals at the 
BOE had little to draw on, in terms of curriculum for grades K-12 on terrorism and 
certainly none on the events of 9/11. The professionals at the BOE acknowledged 
this diversity and in fact, drew upon it, as they developed curriculum based on 
the events of 9/11. Furthermore, they introduced topics such as conflict 
resolution using examples that were familiar to children within the classroom. 
The curricular “fit” was an appropriate aspect of curricular development. Lastly, 
professionals followed what they set out for the rest of the educational 
community by ensuring that the curriculum was vetted before different political 
groups and community based and faith based organizations. This was important 
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for demonstrating a commitment to the processes the curriculum encouraged. On 
a pragmatic level, the sharing of and incorporating views of disparate (possibly) 
groups ensured that the learning environment would not be further disrupted by 
public/legal challenges to the curriculum.   
 
All of these experiences can be adapted to other school systems as professionals 
within them considered curriculum to address terrorism.  
 
3. CURRICULUM PROVIDING A CONDUIT:  Because we live in a “new” era of terrorism, 
the ways in which we teach our children and the manner by which we conduct 
ourselves will continue to be an important issue. The professionals of the BOE 
followed a framework that allowed for the maximum exchange of thoughts, ideas, 
knowledge to continue to militate against fear and support a true atmosphere of 
learning. It can best be summed up in the words of (former) Deputy Chancellor 
Judith Rizzo in a memo to Superintendents, entitled:  Resources for Addressing 
Issues of Tragedy and Terrorism.  She wrote:144
 
Continue to provide an honest accounting of facts and relevant 
details, clarifying any misinformation or misunderstanding students 
may have about what happened. Honesty always helps to re-establish 
a feeling of security and trust. 
 
Always build on what children already know and understand, and 
make judgments as to how much additional information to provide 
 
Let students know that it is okay to talk about unpleasant events, 
and be willing to answer questions and make them feel comfortable 
by reminding them that there are no “silly” questions. 
 
Acknowledge their fears while simultaneously reassuring them. In the days and 





The lessons of fiscal response and recovery are: 1. It is appropriate, when faced 
with catastrophe, to spend as requirements and needs dictate; 2. set-up specially 
designated accounts for spending supports tracking of how money was used, but 
not what priorities emerge by way of that use; 3. the eligibility requirements of 
agencies whose mission it is to reimburse in disaster (FEMA and others) do not 
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always coincide with the reality of spending; and, 4. organizations need to 
become more flexible. 
 
1. SPEND AS NEEDS DICTATE IN CATASTROPHE: The Chief Financial Officer and her 
staff’s most important decision on 9/11 and throughout the crisis was to provide 
permission for spending on various needs concerning the students.147 This 
permission was given to allow the students to receive the services they needed to 
provide for their safety and well-being.   
 
2. ESTABLISH SPECIAL ACCOUNTS AND CODES: This action allowed for ease with 
tracking spending as well as the kind of back-up materials required by FEMA and 
other agencies.  In addition it helps capture costs that might be overlooked in the 
effort to provide the broadest levels of support across different functional areas 
of the BOE.  For instance, that instructional costs turned out to be a major “hit” 
to finances caused by 9/11 can be demonstrated. 
 
The accounting system should also have the ability to track and assign donations.  
Lastly the system should be discussed ahead of time with local representatives 
from FEMA and local and state disaster relief organizations. In this way these 
systems will be constructed in a manner which will maximize the potential for 
reimbursement in accordance with the rules of these funders. 
 
3. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS NEED TO BE ADAPTED: The BOE, by its experience with 
9/11 has a wealth of knowledge to share with local, state and government 
agencies about the realities and impact of catastrophic events for schools. FEMA, 
in particular, learned that it had to adapt its eligibility requirements to meet the 
need of schools as distinct in terroristic situations. On the other hand, the BOE 
discovered that the kind of fiscal flexibility required of it in times of terror is not 
fully present. This was particularly relevant in relation to the U.S. DOE and its 
efforts to give the BOE money for mental health services. Thus, the BOE’s 
experiences illustrates that it is imperative that relief agencies and organizations 
adapt their reimbursement guidelines to address the full needs of schools that 
arise from terrorism. 
 
4. ANTICIPATE HIGH COSTS AND THE CHARACTER OF ORGANIZATIONAL BUREAUCRACY: From 
the experience of the 9/11 terrorist attack it may be assumed that costs will far 
outstrip their reimbursement. Likewise there is a difference in the vocabulary, 
definitions, and regulations between budget divisions. Clarity on what is eligible 
for reimbursement may be elusive, and may require discussion and negotiation 





Safety in the New York City schools is a paramount objective of the BOE.  As such, 
the dedication to it served the system very well in times of uncertainty and 
disaster, precisely because it is formulated on a decentralized basis and 
encourages “ownership” on the part of the Board Professionals within the schools 
themselves. This ownership facilitated the on-the-ground decision making that 
resulted in the wellbeing of students and personnel who were in harm’s way at 
Ground Zero. Important aspects of student safety involves: 1. Involve other 
relevant agencies in the development of safety plans;  2.  redundancy is integral 
to safety planning;  3.  safety Plans should allow for crisis leadership;  4. student 
Safety and Accountability;  5.  all Hazards Planning; and, 6. incident Command 
and Incident Management this can be assured. 
 
1. INVOLVE OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY PLANS: It is 
important that all relevant agencies including law enforcement, fire service, EMS, 
public health and emergency management at a minimum are both involved in the 
development of school safety plans and their evaluation.   
 
2. REDUNDANCY IS INTEGRAL TO SAFETY PLANNING:  School safety plans should allow for 
multiple approaches to handle situations. This will allow for alternatives should 
an initial approach fail or become unavailable.   
 
3. SAFETY PLANS SHOULD ALLOW FOR CRISIS LEADERSHIP:  In the end those at the scene 
must be empowered and trained to make independent decisions. Information and 
communication is often limited and those present will have to make independent 
decisions in times of crisis. Preplanning and training should allow for this.   
 
4. STUDENT SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: As the schools are responsible for the care 
and safety of the children entrusted to them, school safety plans must include the 
priorities of assuring student safety under all events and providing multiple 
methods of accounting for the whereabouts and status of all children during an 
event. This should be a repetitive process and include the process for release of 
students into the care of their parents and others in the absence of their parents 
including documentation and communication of these events.   
 
5. ALL HAZARDS PLANNING:  As history has shown time and time again one can never 
predict the variability of events which can occur. As such safety plans should take 
an all-hazards approach to allow adaptation and planning for any event which 
may occur.   
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6. INCIDENT COMMAND AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: It is important the school safety 
plans be able to interact with the plans of other agencies and the community 
wide plans. In order to facilitate this cross agency collaboration and connection 
common terminology and approach is imperative. By using the common principles 
of Incident Command Systems and Incident Management this can be assured. 
 
